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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

the Commission

erred

in its

interpreta-

tion and application of the standard articulated in Big K Corp.
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984)
(See Appendix "A" hereto), to the facts presented in this case.
2.

Whether the Commission erred as a matter

of

law

in denying petitioner authority to operate as a common carrier
on

the

existing

basis

that

to

do

carriers without

so

would

cause

first making

economic

harm

a determination

to

as to

whether the existing carriers are efficiently operated.
3.

Whether there was substantial evidence to support

the Commission's

conclusion

from the granting

that

the

benefits

to

be

derived

of petitioner's application were outweighed

by the detriments of granting such authority.
4.

Whether

portation market

petitioner's

as a lessor

may

participation in .he transbe

considered

only

on

the

issues of fitness, and not on the issue of public necessity and
convenience.
5.
the

Whe^ er there was substantial evidence to slipport

Commission's

authority would
achieve

conclusion
undercut

sufficient

that

to

grant

the

the ability of existing

financial

stability

provide safe, reliable service.
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so

as

to

requested
-arriers to
£e

able

to

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner

Spreader

Specialists,

Inc.

(referred

to

hereinafter as Petitioner or Spreader Specialists) seeks review
of a final order of the Public Service Commission of Utah denying

Spreader

Specialists'

Petition

for

Reconsideration

and

Reversal of the Commission's earlier Report and Order in Case
No.

84-663-01.

application

The

Commission

denied

Spreader

Specialists'

for authority to operate as a common carrier by

motor vehicle for the transportation of liquid petroleum and
liquid petroleum products (except propane and butane), in bulk,
in tank vehicles over irregular routes from and between all
points and places in the state of Utah.

(R. at 1570, 1695);

(Copies of the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration and
Reversal

and

its

Report

and

Order

are

attached

hereto

as

Appendices "BM and "C," respectively).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Over 40 years ago, three interstate certificates of
authority

to transport

petroleum and petroleum products were

granted to three carriers.

Subsequently, one certificate was

split, resulting in the four base certificates which are now
held by protestants.

While those original certificates have

been expanded, no additional common carriers have been allowed
to enter the Utah intrastate petroleum transportation market.
To
developed

keep
since

up
the

with

the

increased

certificates
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were

demand
originally

that

has

issued,

existing

carriers

have

tions.

It

under

was

increasingly
those

relied

circumstances

Specialists got its start in 1976.

equipment
During
under

Spreader

Specialists

leasing
that

opera-

Spreader

(R. at 62).

Initially a one-man, one-truck
operation,

on

grew

asphalt

transportation

steadily,

adding

both

and manpower to meet the demand of the marketplace.

its

first

eight

lease to various

years,

Spreader

authorized

intrastate and interstate basis.

Specialists

common

carriers

(R. at 22).

the fact that it was operating under

operated

both on an

Notwithstanding

lease to other

certifi-

cated carriers, Spreader Specialists developed its own identity
and

a reputation

for dependable

Spreader

Specialists

expanding

clientele.

now

enjoys

Indeed,

the testimony during

service
a

and

loyal

a common

safe operations.

customer

factor

base

brought

the hearing on petitioner's

and

out by

application,

and one which was never challenged by the protestants, was the
exceptional

service

Specialists.

(R. at 163-64).

At
maintained
all but
use

the

provided

time

of

the

in

the

hearing,

past

Spreader

a fleet of twenty-two tankers trucks

two truck

in transporting

and

trailer

liquid

combinations

asphalt

by

Spreader

Specialists

and trailers;

are insulated for

and crude petroleum.

The

remaining trucks and trailers are equipped with bottom loading
and

vapor

recovery

systems

to

-3-

allow

for

transportation

of

refined

petroleum

products.

All of the trucks are equipped

with the most modern safety equipment.

Spreader Specialists*

fleet of nine asphalt spreading trucks is the most modern among
the common carriers in the state and represents approximately
one-third of the asphalt spreader trucks available from common
carriers in the State of Utah.
In 1983, Pacific

(R. at 21-33).
(MPIEH), the

Intermountain Express

carrier under whose authority Spreader Specialists had operated
for several years, transferred its bulk tank division and its
intrastate
products

authority
to

to

protestant

transport
Matlack,

petroleum

Inc.,

and

("Matlack"),

petroleum
a large

eastern trucking company involved mainly in the transportation
of

chemical

products.

The

relationship

between

Spreader

Specialists and Matlack was patterned initially on the relationship Spreader Specialists had enjoyed with PIE.
the working
marked

by

relationship
Matlack's

between the companies

lack of

knowledge

about

However,

deteriorated,
the

petroleum

transportation industry in the intermountain west, as well as
by a substantial increase in the percentage of revenue retained
by Matlack under the lease agreement.

(R. at 22-23, 268-69).

Additionally, Matlack discontinued holding safety meetings with
its

lease

operators,

including

Spreader

Specialists,

created numerous billing problems with customers.
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and

Matlack also

shifted

more

Specialists
Spreader
than

of

the

until

the

Specialists

Matlack

Specialists.

terminal

relationship

leasing

was

authority

leasing

equipment

(R.

48,

at

responsibilities

303,

and

to

Spreader

basically

one

from Matlack,
drivers

1222-23).

of

rather

from

Spreader

Indeed,

Spreader

Specialists not only arranged hauls for its own equipment, but
it also lined up hauls and jobs for the few pieces of asphalt
spreaders owned and operated by Matlack.
In order to continue providing

(R. at 207).
professional

service

the management of Spreader Specialists came to the conclusion
that

it

Matlack.

could

no

longer

continue

under

its

indenture

to

Therefore, during the early months of 1984, Spreader

Specialists filed applications with the Idaho and Utah Public
Service Commissions seeking intrastate authority to transport
liquid petroleum and petroleum products within those states.
Spreader Specialists also filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission to provide the same service between
all points

and places

in the fourteen western

states.

The

requested authority was granted from the Interstate Commerce
Commission
July 12,

on June 4, 1984 and from the State of Idaho on
1984.

application,

(R.

however,

at

1479).
met

with

Spreader
protests

Specialists1
from

the

Utah
four

authorized carriers, namely Clark Tank Lines ("Clark"), W. S.
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Hatch Company

(HHatchH), Matlack and Energy Express.

(R. at

1370, 1375, 1378, 1384).
At

the hearing

commenced

on July

16, 1984, sixteen

shippers testified in support of the application of Spreader
Specialists.
service

The shippers' testimony evidenced a pattern of

failures

by

the

protesting

carriers,

actual

and

projected increases in the need for common carrier service and
substantial benefits which would result from a grant
requested authority.
the

self-serving

of the

The protesting carriers relied solely on

testimony

of

their

operating

officers

to

refute the presentation of Spreader Specialists.
Subsequent to the hearing, but prior to the submission
of

post-hearing

briefs,

the Utah

Supreme

Court

issued

its

opinion in Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah,
infra.
Briefs were submitted
1984

and

the

April 12, 1985.

Commission

by the parties on October 4,

issued

its

Report

and

Order

on

It found petitioner financially and operation-

ally fit, but denied the authority because the financial condition of the protesting

carriers was

such that

entry

of an

additional carrier would cause them financial harm and could
not be justified by any benefits which might be realized.
at 1506).
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(R.

A Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal filed with
the Commission on May 2, 1985, was denied on November 5, 1985.
However, the Commission specifically invited this Court to give
direction on the issues raised by this case.

(R. at 1695).

Spreader Specialists thereafter filed its Petition for Review
with this Court.

(R. at 1699).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

While deregulation of public transportation has swept
across

the

regulated
protect

country,
trucking

the

little

has

industry.

shipping

public,

changed

Regulation,
has

improving transportation services.

now

in

Utah's

once

become

a

tightly

erected

to

barrier

to

The Public Service Commis-

sion's narrow construction of this Court's decision in Big K
Corp. makes it virtually impossible for a new entrant to obtain
operating authority.
Big

K.

Corp.

rejected

the

old

approach

to public

convenience and necessity and emphasized the need to focus on
the benefits that flow from competition.

Notwithstanding the

Court's decision in Big K, and the overwhelming need for additional

service

established

in

the

hearing,

the

Commission

focused on the incredibly unlikely harm the protesting carriers
might

suffer

if Spreader Specialists were granted authority.

In so holding, the Commission erroneously disregarded the fact
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that

Spreader

providing

Specialists,

service

protestants.

and

as

already

a

lessor,

stands

in

is

and

already

competition

with

The Commission also erred as a matter of law by

concluding that potential diversionary harm to protestants was
too

great

to

justify

granting

the

authority

without

first

making a finding that protestants are efficiently operated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN BIG K FAVORS
ENTRY OF NEW CARRIERS WHERE PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY WILL BE BENEFITED.
This

Court

and

the

Commission

requires

that

an

applicant seeking authority to operate as a common carrier must
make a showing of financial, regulatory and operational fitness
before it can obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.

In the Matter of the Application of Big K Corpora-

tion, Case No. 81-439-01 (June 14, 1982), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds. Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689
P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1953).
case,

the

Commission

explicitly

concluded

that

In this
Spreader

Specialists satisfied the requirements of financial, regulatory
and operational fitness.

Its error was finding

that public

necessity and convenience would not be served by a grant of the
authority to Petitioner.
In

1984,

this

Court

reviewed

the

standard

to

be

applied for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience
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and necessity to a new motor carrier.

In Big K, the Commis-

sion's order denying a certificate of public convenience and
necessity

to

Big

K Corporation

was

reversed

and

the case

remanded for clarification of the appropriate standard to be
applied when determining public need in transportation cases.
Citing Utah Department

of Administrative

Services

v. Public

Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983), the Court
noted that it generally will not defer to the Commission on
issues

of

law.

We

asked

the Court

to

exercise

its legal

prerogatives in the present case where the issues are the same
under the Big K case.
Referring to Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1953), the Court
in Big K Corp. emphasized the responsibility of the Commission
to

authorize

new

service

when

it

finds

that

H

the

public

convenience and necessity require the proposed service or any
part thereof."
meaning

id. at 1356.

The Court defined "necessity" as

"reasonably necessary and not absolutely imperative,"

and stated further that "[a]ny service or improvement which is
desirable for the public welfare and highly important to the
public convenience may properly be regarded as necessary."

Id.

at 1354.

"[A] service is not necessarily adequate because [a]

community

can

further

or

'get

by,•

additional

can

conduct

service."

its

Mulcahy

business
v.

Public

without
Service

Commission, 101 Utah 2d 245, 252, 117 P.2d 298, 301 (1941).

-9-

Factors to be considered

by the Commission when determining

whether the public interest and necessity would be served by
additional service include among others:
The benefits to be derived from increased
competition/ such as the potential beneficial effect upon rates, customer service,
the
acquisition
of
equipment,
greater
responsiveness in meeting future shipper
needs, and greater efficiency in the use of
route structures and interlining arrangements. (Citation omitted.)
Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d at 1354.
Big K Corp. dispels a growing notion that Utah Code
Ann. § 54-6-1 £t seg., and the Court's earlier decisions interpreting that statute, require a finding by the Commission that
existing motor carrier services must be wholly deficient before
a new carrier will be granted authority.

The Court rejected

this interpretation by the Commission of its prior rulings and
H

stated that

deficiencies in existing service" constitute but

one factor among many which must be considered by the Commission when

considering

applications

for

new

authority.

The

••ultimate criterion- against which all relevant factors are to
be evaluated, according to the Court, is the "public good and
convenience.N
The
originally

Id. at 1355.
limited

extended

protection
to existing

from

competitive

forces

carriers has mistakenly and

improperly been elevated to, and equated with, the concept of
"public

good

and

convenience."

-10-

Historically,

regulation of

transportation

services

was

intended

uninterrupted service to communities
to

prevent

carriers.

predatory,
As

carriers

carriers would sometimes

insure

reliable,

at affordable prices and

below-cost
increased

to

competition

by

large

in size and number, large

force smaller competitors

out of a

geographic market and then later either withdraw their services
from that market, thereby severing the lifeline of commerce, or
raise the price of service, thereby putting shippers at their
mercy.
Eventually,
authorized

and

due

in

carriers to protect

large

part

to

efforts

by

their monopolistic positions,

notions of public convenience and necessity were replaced by
emphasis on market entry requirements designed to make market
entry virtually impossible.

The Big K Corp. opinion unmistak-

ably re-sets the proper course by declaring that the ultimate
test in motor carrier applications to be the public good and
convenience

and "not the existing

carriers' convenience

necessity."

Id. at 1355; (Emphasis added).

and

Competition, while

fundamentally at odds with the interests of existing authorized
carriers, "is almost always an affirmative factor in furthering
the public convenience and necessity."

Id. at 1354.

In fact,

the Court in Big K declared that the term "public convenience
and necessity" should be construed to foster competition whenever feasible.

Id.

-11-

A factor to be considered

protestants1

authority

might

have

Court

Bio

recognized

in

K

on

is the impact

that

a

the grant of

operations.
legitimate

While

factor

the

to

be

considered is the effect the increased competition will have on
existing carriers, that factor has bearing only to the extent
that

the existing carriers' ability to provide safe, reliable

service is not undercut.
rejected

as a reason

I£. at 1354.

for denying

The Court

specifically

an application the argument

raised by protestants herein that the diversion of income will
cause injury to the existing carriers.

The Court declared:

Nevertheless,
the
fact
that
additional
competition
will
divert
revenues
from
existing carriers is not a valid reason by
itself to justify a denial of additional
authority.
The ultimate criterion against which
all relevant factors are to be evaluated is
the Hpublic good and convenience," (citation
omitted) not the existing carriers' convenience and necessity.
Id. at 1355; (Emphasis added).
The

Big

certification
and

away

re-emphasis

K

Corp.

proceedings

from
of

decision

refocused

on the public

protection

the Court's

of

good

existing

the emphasis
and

convenience

carriers.

policy was necessary

in

in

This

order

to

bring the Commission back in line with the basic purpose of the
regulatory scheme, a purpose that had been skewed by existing
carriers to provide financial protection to them at the expense
of competition.
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II.

THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS A FINDING
THAT THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM A GRANT
OF AUTHORITY TO PETITIONER OUTWEIGH ANY
ASSOCIATED DETRIMENTS AND THE COMMISSION'S
CONCLUSIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
A.

There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service

Available for the Transportation of Asphalt.
Numerous private contractors, asphalt suppliers, city
and

county

road

departments,

and

state

agencies

testified

during the hearing to the fact that there is and has been a
substantial deficiency in the equipment available to meet their
asphalt needs.

There was substantial testimony that during the

peak months of the asphalt season, beginning in late May and
continuing through September, there is an insufficient number
of asphalt

spreaders

needs of the public.

available within the state to meet the
Several shippers testified that there are

also deficiencies in the existing service in the transportation
of asphalt to and from storage sites and other points where
asphalt is used or stored.

Dissatisfaction, to the point of

refusal by the shipper to call upon the protesting carriers,
was also expressed by testifying shippers.
Specifically, the representative for District 5 of the
Utah Department of Transportation testified that on an annual
basis he has difficulties obtaining asphalt spreading equipment
and qualified drivers, with the problem becoming more acute in
the future because of the closure of Arizona Refinery.

In his

opinion there was a definite need for more qualified spreader
drivers and spreader equipped trucks.

-13-

(R. at 131, 141).

Likewise,

the

Regional

Manager

for

Koch

Asphalt

indicated that 95% of its asphalt transportation needs are met
by common carrier, that there has been a deficiency

in the

transportation

in

services

available

to

him

and

that

his

opinion there is an inadequate supply of asphalt transportation
equipment available in the State of Utah.

(R. at 158, 160 and

162).
The Transportation Manager

for Staker Paving & Con-

struction, Inc., one of the largest private contractors in the
state, testified that each year there is a shortage of asphalt
equipment and that he experiences

problems obtaining

service

from all of the common carriers presently authorized to operate
in the State of Utah.

(R. at 203-4).

Staker Paving asserted

that there is Ma big need" for an additional authorized carrier
and feels that "there is not enough equipment available to meet
the needs."

(R. p. 209, 221).

Another

large

contractor

involved

in

the

asphalt

industry is Jack B. Parson Companies, with asphalt plants in
Ogden, Brigham City and Smithfield, Utah, testified through its
representative that because of the inability of the protesting
carriers to provide service in the past, it has relied solely
on the services of Spreader Specialists during 1983 and 1982.
(R. at 323, 331-32).

He also testified that on both occasions

in 1984 when he was forced to call Clark, it failed to provide
adequate service.
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Fife

Rock

Products

Co.,

Inc.

presented

testimony

through its asphalt road foreman which indicated that in 1983,
protestant Clark was unable to provide service when called upon
and that it relied on the service of Spreader Specialists for
its asphalt transportation needs.

(R. at 354-56).

Dell Maxwell testified on behalf
Inc.

of Asphalt

Systems,

and stated that although many of its transportation needs

have been met
utilizes

Clark

by Spreader
for

the

Specialists

delivery

of

in

the

Naptha

past,

to

its

it

also

facility.

Although Clark is generally able to provide a truck, it ~s late
approximately 80% of the time.
Maxwell, this causes
because

of

the

(R. at 373).

substantial

product

mixing

problems

sequence

manufacture the finished product
Inc.

(R.

at

373-75).

for

his

required

marketed

Mr. Maxwell

According to Mr.

no

operations

in order to

by Asphalt
longer

Systems,

utilizes

the

service of protestant Hatch because of service failures in the
past

and

dissatisfaction

with

their

transportation

service.

(R. at 375-77).

support

A

representative

of

the

years of
had

of

application

Logan

and

City

indicated

also
that

appeared
in

over

in
four

supervising the Logan City Maintenance Department he

never

protesting

been contacted
carriers

until

by any

representatives

of

the

four

a few days prior to the hearing on

this application when he was contacted by a representative of
Clark.

(R. at 537).

According to Logan City, there is a need

for an additional authorized carrier in the State of Utah.
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(R.

at 543).

Logan City has been totally reliant on the services

of Spreader Specialists since none of the other carriers have
demonstrated

any

interest

in

serving

the

northern

Utah

community.
Mr. Robert Wheadon

appeared

in his capacity as the

State Maintenance Engineer for the Department of Transportation
for the State of Utah.

Mr. Wheadon

and the State of Utah

supported the application insofar as it would provide another
authorized

and qualified carrier to provide assistance in the

transportation and spreading

of asphalt.

(R. at 561).

Mr.

Wheadon testified that the Department of Transportation did not
anticipate

purchases

of

asphalt

spreading

or

transporting

equipment and that even though each maintenance district has
its own spreader equipped
used.

(R. at 558-59).

truck, they are small

and rarely

Mr. Wheadon also indicated that in the

estimation of the State Department of Transportation there is a
substantial

inadequacy

of

equipment

available

to

serve

the

asphalt industry as it presently stands in the state and as it
is contemplated in the immediate future.

(R. at 562).

Similar testimony was offered by the Box Elder County
Road Department.
has

had

During the past two years, Box Elder County

difficulty

occasions.

(R.

at

obtaining
610).

spreader

The

County

equipment
Road

on

several

Department

has

refused to use protestant Clark's service during the two years
prior to the hearing because of prior dissatisfaction.
609).
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(R. at

Entities unable to appear

at the hearing but which

supported the application by submitting shipper support statements

include Weber

County,

Emery

County,

Duchesne

County,

Cache County, Asphalt Supply & Service, Asphalt Paving Corp.,
Trumbull

Asphalt,

LeGrand

Johnson

Intermountain Oil Company.

Construction

Company

and

These support statements indicate

that additional transportation services are needed, that there
is not enough equipment

available

and

that

the

quality of

Spreader Specialists* services surpass the service avabilable
from the other carriers.
An examination of the record and the support statements on file with the Commission clearly

indicates

a defi-

ciency in the existing services available to the public for the
transportation

and

spreading

of

asphalt.

The

deficiencies

attested to by the numerous witnesses exist notwithstanding the
fact

that

Spreader

Specialists

is

and

has

been

providing

service to a large segment of the market through its leasing
arrangements.
B.

There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service

Available for the Transportation of Crude Petroleum.
Three

supporting

shippers

appeared

on

behalf

of

Spreader Specialists' application to transport crude petroleum;
namely,

Chevron,

U.S.A.

("Chevron"),

American

Oil

Company

("Amoco"), and Geokinetics, Inc. ("Geokinetics").
Larry

Mouton,

Transportation

Manager

for

Amoco,

testified that the transportation services presently available
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to Amoco within the State of Utah are inadequate and unacceptable.

(R. at 634).

Mr. Mouton testified

that

on numerous

occasions during 1984 each of the protesting carriers refused
to transport loads of crude oil from the Amoco serviced well
sites

to

the refinery

in Salt Lake City.

(R. at 635-44).

Amoco, as a matter of policy, typically does not support applications of common carriers, but the service available in Utah
had deteriorated to such a point that Amoco decided it had to
do

something

to

insure

that

it would have common

available to enable it to meet its commitments
crude oil.

While

is

service.

(R. at 635).

it would

carrier

example

to transport

(R. at 634). Mr. Mouton indicated he is frequently

unable to get trucks.

common

carriers

be repetitous to recite each of the

service

failures

indicative

Shortly

of

after

the

one

experienced
deficiency

close

call

by
in

Amoco,
the

whereby

one

existing
protestant

Clark's late arrival almost resulted in the shut down of an oil
well, Clark agreed to transport four loads of crude oil from a
well
anyone

site

in Utah

at Amoco

service,

Clark

to Amoco*s

that
failed

refinery.

it would

be

to move

the

Without

unable
oil

as

to

informing

provide

agreed

that

from the

storage tanks at the well site resulting in the well being shut
in.

Mr. Mouton testified about numerous other occasions

!This not only cost the producer upwards of $350,000 in
lost revenue plus additional costs of startup, but also
resulted in serious damage to customer relations between Amoco
and that particular producer. (R. at 638; Exh. 23).
-18-

where Clark had either been unable to provide transportation
service

or

the

service

provided

had been unacceptable with

regard both to timeliness and spills of product.

(R. at Vol.

3, pp. 636, 637, 647, 648, 653, 654).
Likewise, protestant Hatch failed to provide adequate
service to Amoco.

(R. at 639-40).

Mr. Mouton testified that

Hatch repeatedly turned down loads of crude petroleum.

(R. at

640).
Despite

Matlack's

efforts

service, it also turned down

to

provide

Amoco

with

loads of crude oil because of

unavailability of equipment and drivers.

(R. at 649-50).

The protestants attempted to paint Mr. Mouton as an
unreasonable man with unreasonable expectations.

However, as

Mr. Mouton testified, he is not able to control the flow of
crude oil or regulate the amount of on-site storage available.
(R. at 650, 1218).

It should be remembered that it is Amoco

that is dissatisfied with existing service, not just Mr. Mouton
personally.

Protestants cannot

eliminate the tough customer

from the market place for purposes of assessing market conditions; after all, the customer justifies their existence.
Chevron

also appeared

in support

of

portion of Spreader Specialists' application.

the

crude oil

Mr. Al Taylor,

Regional Transportation Manager for Chevron, testified that the
transportation

services

provided

by

common

carriers

in the

State of Utah as compared to other western states is "below
average."

(R. at 492). Chevron determined that it was in its
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best interest to support the application because of the service
problems

it

has

experienced

both

with

respect

to

crude

petroleum and refined products in Utah during the six months
preceding

the hearing.

(R. at 491).

within the Chevron organization
the

transportation

testified

that

he

September

through

responsible

of

crude

has

difficulty

May

getting

Jim Rich/

petroleum

equipment

for coordinating

within

during

the
to

the person

the

state,

months

transport

from
crude

petroleum from the Uintah Basin to the refineries in the Salt
Lake City/Woodscross area.

(R. at 510).

Mr. Rich indicated

that on numerous occasions during the months from September to
May he has called each of the carriers and been unable to get
equipment when needed.

(R. at 511).

He indicated

that the

problem is not related to any one carrier, but is general to
all authorized

common

carriers presently

available.

In Mr.

Rich's opinion, there is a need for additional equipment in the
State of Utah.

On cross-examination Mr. Rich did indicate that

the efforts and cooperation of the existing carriers has been
excellent, but maintained that notwithstanding such cooperation
Chevron still has difficulty obtaining the necessary services.
(R. at 526).
needs

for

The protestants attempted

an additional carrier

during short-term seasonal peaks.

to limit Mr. Rich's

to an occasional difficulty
However, Mr. Rich's final

statement after direct, cross and redirect examination was that
despite the existing carrier's efforts to provide service there
still exists a deficiency in the service available.
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C.

There Exists a Deficiency in the Existing Service

Available for the Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products.
The

commodities

falling

under

this

broad

category

include such petroleum products as gasolines, diesel fuel, jet
fuel, aviation fuel and burner fuel.

Key supporting shippers

for these commodities were again Chevron and Amoco.
has

been

hampered

pick-ups

of

by

refined

(Exhs. 18-20).

numerous
product

late
by

the

deliveries

Chevron

and

protesting

tardy

carriers.

Likewise, there was testimony as to a number of

instances where the protesting carriers have turned down shipments tendered to them by Chevron.

In fact, because of the

extremely poor service by Energy Express, Chevron withdrew its
volume tender arrangement from Energy Express in February of
1984,

and is hesitant to tender even single loads to it now

because of a complete lack of confidence
drivers.

in Energy Express1

(R. at 1175).
A key service failure highlighted by Chevron was the

fact that despite numerous requests by Chevron, the protesting
carriers continually sent improperly trained and inexperienced
drivers

to the

loading facility.

(R. at 1176).

Mr. Snider

indicated that all of these problems are simply representative
of

the

lack

carriers.

of

service

(R. at 420).

presently

provided

by

existing

Chevron maintains that the level of

service presently provided by common carriers is unacceptable
and is of the opinion that there is a need for an additional
carrier

in Utah

for the transportation

(R. at 434).
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of refined products.

Amoco also expressed dissatisfaction with the service
it has received from the protesting carriers with respect to
the transportation of refined petroleum products.

For example/

Energy Express failed on one occasion to transport diesel fuel
to a well site in a timely fashion, forcing a shut down of the
well and causing Amoco to lose a very substantial customer.
(R. at 628).

Because of service failures of Energy Express,

Amoco no longer uses their services except where required by
government contract to use a minority carrier.

(R. at 630).

Management for Energy Express indicated to Amoco in 1984 that
they

did

needs.

not

have

enough

equipment

available

to meet

its

(R. at 641).
Clearly, the record supports a finding that, contrary

to the Commission's

erroneous conclusion, there

is indeed a

deficiency in the existing service presently available to the
public with respect to the transportation of asphalt, crude oil
and refined petroleum products.
D.

The Projected Growth in the Utah Asphalt Industry

Justifies the Granting of a Certificate to Spreader Specialists.
Perhaps the greatest anticipated increase in the need
for

common

voiced

by

carrier
Staker

service

Paving.

for
In

asphalt

1983, Staker

approximately 600,000 tons of asphalt.
in 1984, the year

of

the

transportation

hearing

on

Paving

was

utilized

It was anticipated that
Spreader

Specialists'

application, Staker Paving would utilize over 1,000,000 tons of
asphalt and perhaps even more in 1985.
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(R. at 199). According

to Rod Thurston, transportation manager for Staker Paving, the
asphalt paving business in the future will be Hcrazy."
200).

In order

to meet the increased demand, Staker Paving

changed to an around-the-clock operation.
the

increase

(R. at

in

asphalt

(R. at 201). All of

transportation

incurred

Paving will be tendered to common carriers.

by

Staker

(R. at 201).

The representative of Jack B. Parson Companies testified that they anticipated an increase of between 25% to 50%
for 1984 and hoped that the increase would also carry over into
1985.

That

carrier.

entire

increase

was

to

be

handled

by

common

(R. at 325).
Fife Rock Products' representative testified that in

his

experience

and

asphalt maintenance
355).

opinion
industry

there was

more activity

in 1984 than in 1983.

in the
(R. at

Koch Asphalt indicated that it anticipates an increase

in its need for common carrier service.

(R. at 174).

Logan

City plans to increase their asphalt program by one-third for
1984 and 1985.

(R. at 535).

Significant testimony as to projected increases in the
asphalt maintenance work conducted by the Department of Transportation
Wheadon.
a

for

the

State

of Utah was

given

by Mr. Robert

Mr. Wheadon indicated that there has been in the past

tendency

to

neglect

state

roads

and

highways

directing funds to the interstate highway system.
interstate

system

substantially
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in place, highway

in

favor

With the
funds are

being diverted again to state highways which are in considerable need of repair and maintenance.
forecasted
asphalt

to

a 10% to
state

15% increase

job

As a result, Mr. Wheadon,
in

sites during

the

1984

transportation
and

a 25% to 35%

increase for each of the next three or four years.
564).

of

(R. at

According to Mr. Wheadon the State of Utah is planning

on a very definite increase in the asphalt maintenance work
done by the state, which increase will be met through utilization of common carrier service.
E.

The

Transportation

of

Projected
Crude

(R. at 560).

Increases
Oil

in

the

Justify

Production

Granting

and

Spreader

Specialists' Application.
In addition to the testimony rendered with respect to
increases

in

supporting

the

asphalt

transportation

industry,
of

crude

each
oil

of

also

the

witnesses

indicated

that

there are substantial increases projected for the production of
crude

petroleum.

Specifically,

Chevron

anticipated

an

8%

increase in production in 1985 as well as an 8% increase in
1986.

All of the increased volume was to be tendered to common

carriers.

(R. at 508).

Amoco similarly anticipated
(R.

at

625-26).

Although

increases

Mr. Mouton

in production.

did not

quantify the

percentage of increase anticipated, he indicated that several
new high producing wells located in Utah will soon be on line
and that all of the production coming out of those wells would
be tendered to common carriers for transportation to the Amoco
refinery.

(R. at 625).
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Geokinetics

also

its production of crude

forecasts

shale oil.

approximately 200 barrels a day.
construction

at

the

substantial

time

of

Current

increases

production

in

is at

A processing plant was under

the

hearing

which

will

enable

Geokinetics to increase its production to 1,000 barrels a day
by 1985.
tion of

(R. at 474).
additional

Geokinetics anticipates

plants which would

further

the construcincrease

their

production capability, and thus, their need for common carrier
service.

(R. at 475).
F.

portation

The Projected
of

Refined

Increases

Petroleum

in the

Products

Need

for

Justifies

Trans-

Granting

Spreader Specialists' Application.
Finally, there was also substantial testimony concerning the anticipated increases in the transportation of refined
petroleum

products.

Chevron

anticipated

an

increase

of

approximately 7% in the volume of refined products shipped out
of the Salt Lake refinery to Utah locations in 1985.

(R. at

407).

common

The entire

carriers.

(R.

at

7% increase
Vol.

2, p.

was

to

99).

be
In

tendered
addition

increase in volume, Chevron indicated that it had

to
to

the

7%

permanently

eliminated two proprietary driver positions, thereby decreasing
their

proprietary

fleet

capacity

and

resulting

in

an

larger increase in the volume tendered to common carrier.
at 407).

even
(R.

The reduction in drivers resulted in an annual shift

of some 4,000,000 gallons of refined petroleum to Utah common
carriers.

(R.

at

407-9).

In
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1984,

Chevron

anticipated

tendering
common

an additional

1,485

carriers, bringing

loads of refined petroleum to

the total to some 9,000 loads of

refined petroleum transported for Chevron by common carrier on
an annual basis.

(Bxh. 17).

Amoco also anticipated growth in their refined product
group.

Any increase in the amount of refined products shipped

by Amoco would have necessarily been be transported by common
carrier because of the fact that Amoco's proprietary fleet was
already operating at capacity.

(R. at 625).

Spreader Specialists' own expansion is indeed indicative of a growing demand.
a

one-truck,

independently

one-man

Spreader Specialists has grown from

operation

recognized

in

operation.

1976

to

a

full

scale,

This growth has been in

response to substantial increases in market demand.

Spreader

Specialists

Although

has

not

been

alone

in

its

growth.

reluctant to admit it, Hatch and Clark made several equipment
acquisitions because of increased demand around the time of the
hearing, notwithstanding
idle equipment.

their representations that they have

(R. at 884, 1085).

III. ANY DETRIMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A
GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO SPREADER SPECIALISTS
WOULD BE MINIMAL AND WOULD AFFECT ONLY
PROTESTANTS AND NOT THE PUBLIC. ,
The Commission is directed by statute not to grant a
certificate of convenience and necessity if it finds that to do
so would "be detrimental to the best interests of the people of
the State of Utah."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5.
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Protestants*

presentations to the Commission were based on the inaccurate
premise that mere economic loss to an existing carrier constitutes detriment to the people of the State of Utah.

This Court

has held that "the fact that additional competition will divert
revenues from existing carriers is not a valid reason by itself
to justify a denial of additional authority.H

Big K Corp. v.

Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d at 1355. While the Commission may consider

the economic

existing

insofar

carriers

as

impact

it

of a new

impairs

entrant

on

the safety of the

public or the carriers' ability to provide reliable service,
the testimony of the protestants, without exception, was that
they are safety conscious and reliable, and intend to remain so.
Protestants

presented

company

testified that if Spreader Specialists
the

result

will

be

financial

ruin

representatives
is granted

for

their

who

authority,

organization.

Applicant can only consider these outrageous estimations of its
ability to divert business away from the existing carriers as
either

a

compliment

to

the

service

performed

by

Spreader

Specialists, or, more realistically, as a groundless statement
advanced to protect protestants' positions as monopolies.
The
operating

at

fact

that

Spreader

full

capacity

under

Specialists
lease

during

was
the

already
asphalt

season at all times relevant here, and thus already enjoyed a
substantial market share, requires that protestants' "diversion
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of business" argument be looked at in a different context from
that which would apply in the case of a new entrant.

It is not

the case that Spreader Specialists will be entering the market
for the first time, thereby threatening existing market shares;
Spreader Specialists

already controls a significant share of

the market and simply seeks the right to continue to service
those customers

requesting

assistance without having to line

the pockets of some broker.
Numerous supporting witnesses testified that Spreader
Specialists is the only carrier providing the services needed
by them, although they acknowledge that it has done so under
the authority of other carriers.
company

providing

certificate.

the

Shippers identify with the

service,

Unfortunately,

not

to

with

operate

the holder of the
independently

of

existing carriers one must obtain a certificate; a task which
has

become

Specialists

nearly

impossible

operates under

in

Utah.

Whether

Spreader

lease to Matlack or to any other

authorized carrier, it is safe to assume that a majority of its
customers would continue to call it regardless of the authority
under which they operate.

Thus, if Spreader Specialists were

granted the authority to operate on its own, and assuming that
Spreader

Specialists maintains

a substantial

portion

of the

market it has already captured, there would be no basic diversion of customer accounts away from Clark, Energy Express or
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Hatch.

If diversion does occur, it will be because of customer

preference and service, not merely because of the presence of a
new carrier.

The possibility of diversion in this form exists

currently and will continue to be an economic force as long as
Spreader Specialists operates.
The

possibility

of

diversion

away

from

Matlack

is

slightly different, but not nearly as significant as portrayed
by Matlack.
of

the

At worst Matlack would be losing only 13 percent

revenue

products

by

derived

Spreader

from

the

Specialists.

transportation

(R.

at

of
2

petroleum

777).

Ac:ording

to Matlack's operating witness, it might be in Matlack's best
interest

if Spreader

Specialists

obtained

its

own

authority,

since he maintained that almost all of the revenue retained by
Matlack under the Spreader

Specialists'

lease

is used

the costs associated with the lease arrangement.

to pay

(R. at 781).

In any event, the possible diver- sion away from Matlack would
not seriously threaten the finan- cial stability of a company
with over

$28,000,000

in retained

earnings

in

1983.

(R. at

738).
An examination of Exhibits 76 and 77 utilized at the
hearing to show the potential diversion of income away from the

2

At present 100 percent of the spreading
on to Spreader Specialists. (R. at 779).
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income is passed

protestants

to

Spreader

Specialists

is

very

(Appendices *DM and "E" hereto, respectively).

revealing.

Exhibit 76 is

based on the assumption of a zero percent increase in revenue
for

1984

for

Spreader

the entire

Specialists

applicable

market.

In

order

to achieve its very optimistic

for

revenue

goal for 1984, it would need to divert only 1.78 percent of
each

of

protestantfs

the

receipts.

gross

revenue

to

its

own

gross

In terms of dollars Spreader Specialists would only

be diverting $42,917 away from Clark which enjoyed intrastate
revenue

of

Express

which

1983;

$2,738,132
enjoyed

$45,709

away

for

1983;

intrastate

from

$38,213

away

revenue

Matlack

which

of

from

Energy

$2,142,614

enjoyed

for

intrastate

revenue of $2,700,000 for 1983; and $19,989 away from Hatch
which

enjoyed

(Appendix

W

intrastate

DH).

revenue

of

$7,488,647

for

1983.

That percentage and those dollar figures would

be even less if the diversion of income is spread across the
entire

petroleum

transportation

industry

in Utah or if the

total revenue is increased proportionately.

Exhibit 77 is a

diversion projection based on an assumption of a conservative 5
percent market increase to be enjoyed equally by each of the
protesting

carriers

growth, only 1.4

and

the Petitioner.

Given

that market

percent of each of the protestanfs

gross

revenue would have to be diverted by Spreader Specialists in
order

to

reach

its

generous

Again, the percentage diverted

revenue

projection

for

1984.

from each of the protestants

would decrease if the diversionary effect were spread across
the industry to proprietary fleets as well.
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Although

in fiscal year 1984, Spreader Specialists'

gross revenue, intrastate and interstate, was only $1 million,
protestants

allege that Spreader Specialists, if granted the

authority, would be able to divert some $8 million in revenues
away from them.

(Exh. 76).

Spreader Specialists simply does

not have the equipment, the manpower or the financial capital
to divert the magnitude of income away from protestants as they
have represented.

The argument to

the contrary

is totally

speculative and it was error for the Commission to so conclude.
As borne out by the testimony of numerous witnesses,
Spreader Specialists has, under the lease operations, already
diverted some business away from the existing carriers.

The

reason for such diversion as testified to has been on the basis
of service:
service

by

Specialists

either poor service by the protestants or good
Spreader
into

Specialists.

the market

as

If the entry of Spreader
an

authorized

carrier

will

somehow force the existing carriers to operate more efficiently
and provide better service to the public, then the basic goal
of the Commission as mandated by statute and the Utah Supreme
Court to provide better service to the public will have been
well served.
The

protestants

presented

absolutely

no

credible

evidence that the granting of authority to Spreader Specialists
will

cause

them

real

economic

providing safe, reliable service.
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harm

or

prevent

them

from

IV.

WHERE A GRANT OF NEW AUTHORITY BENEFITS THE
PUBLIC, PROTESTING CARRIERS HAVE THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING THEY WILL BE PREVENTED FROM
PROVIDING SAFE, RELIABLE SERVICE AND FROM
COMPLYING WITH MOTOR CARRIER REGULATIONS.
Once an applicant

benefit

establishes

that

the

public will

from a grant of the requested authority, the burden

should shift to the protesting parties to show that the public
convenience and necessity would not be best served by granting
the application.
Order denying

It is clear from the Commission's Report and

authority herein that little consideration was

given to the numerous benefits to be derived from a grant of
authority.
imagined

Rather, the application was denied because of the
impact

the

additional

competition

might

have

on

existing carriers.
The initial focus of the Supreme Court in Big K Corp.
was on the benefits to be derived from competition.

The Court

then balanced

carriers'

those benefits

ability to provide
noted

that

against

safe, reliable

the impact

additional

the

existing

service.

While the Court

competition

might

have on

existing carriers may not be wholly disregarded, it carefully
restricted

the scope of review

regarding

that

impact.

The

Court cautioned the Commission not to undercut the ability of
efficiently operated carriers to achieve sufficient financial
stability so that they can (1) provide reliable service, (2)
comply with public

safety

regulations, and
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(3) conform with

other

business

development
long

regulatory

policies

and growth of new

that

further

industries.

Ifi. at

economic
1354.

As

as existing carriers cannot continue to provide reliable

service

and comply with

safety

and business

regulations, the

benefits of competition will tip the scales in favor of the new
carrier.
their

On the other

burden

of

hand,

proof

by

if protesting

showing

through

carriers

can meet

competent

evidence

that they are efficiently operated and that, despite their good
management, they will be impaired to the point of being unable
to perform

safely

and

reliably,

then the

requested

authority

should probably, although not necessarily, be denied.
The Commission has no duty to protect
of

an inefficiently operated carrier.

good,

it should

not protect

such

the

operations

Indeed, for the public

a carrier.

A

new

carrier

should not be denied the opportunity to provide better service
because of another carrier's inefficiencies.
The primary
protesting

carriers

argument
in

for denying

motor

carrier

authority raised by
cases

is

that

the

protesting carriers would be injured by a diversion of income,
an

argument

flatly

rejected

in

Big

K

Corp.

Id.

at

1355.

Citing the United States Supreme Court in Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United

States, 355 U.S. 83, 91

(1957),

Supreme Court in Big K Corp. stated:
[N]o carrier is entitled to protection from
competition in the continuance of a service
that fails to meet the public need, nor, by
the
same
token,
should
the
public
be
deprived of a new and improved
service
because it may divert some traffic from
other carriers.
689 P.2d at 1354.
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the Utah

To satisfy their burden, the protesting carriers must
do something more than simply allege economic loss.

Initially

they should be required to show that they are being efficiently
operated.

If it is apparent that there is room for improve-

ment, then that factor should be taken into consideration when
evaluating the alleged harm to existing carriers.

Next, they

should be required to demonstrate, through competent evidence,
that the financial harm to their operations would be so significant

that

it would

continue operating, and

substantially

impair

if they continued

their

ability to

to operate, their

income from operations would be so reduced that they could not
meet safety requirements or pay for the filing fees for annual
reports.
Although no such showings were made by any of the
protesting

carriers

during

the hearing, the Commission held

that the potential financial danger to the protesting carriers
3
was too great to grant the application.
It took this
position even though Petitioner presented substantial evidence
showing glaring inefficiencies in protestants' operations, the

3

Protestant Clark Tank Lines filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah on February 7, 1986, and
has given notice of its intent to transfer its Utah intrastate
authority. The financial condition of Clark is the result of
unchecked and uncontrolled inefficiencies in the face of
increased revenues as evidenced by the reports to the Public
Service Commission filed by the protestants for the years
1982-1984.
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most telling of which revolved around several of the protestants'

leasing

arrangements

with

principals

of

the

company

whereby equipment was leased on long term leases and payments
were

made

to

the

principals

regardless

of

need.

In

this

manner, the carriers are able to pass large portions of revenue
on to principals of the company without showing it as income to
4
the

company.

It

is

impossible

to

tell

from

the

reports

filed by the protesting carriers what their actual financial
condition is.
The Commission erred as a matter of law by determining
that protestants were efficiently operated before denying the
application of Spreader

Specialists on the grounds that the

financial harm to the existing carriers would be too great.
CONCLUSION
As

is the policy behind the Motor Carrier Act, the

Utah regulatory scheme should be Hadministered with an eye to
affirmatively

improving

to preserving

existing

Public

transportation

facilities, not merely

arrangements. . . .H

Service Commission,

689 P.2d

Big K Corp. v.

at 1354, quoting McLean

Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 86 (1944).

Peti-

tioner merely seeks the opportunity to play a part in improving

4

See Spreader Specialists Petition for Reconsideration
and its Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal for a more detailed discussion of the
misleading nature of protestants' leasing arrangement. (R. at
1508, 1674).
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motor common carrier service in Utah, a role it has been forced
to play up to now as an indentured servant.
monopoly

for

the

transportation

of

The forty year old

liquid

petroleum

and

products in Utah should now be broken in the public interest.
That

will

require

the

reversal

of

the

Commission's

Order

denying the application, and that the authority as requested be
granted.
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as a guarantor, was liable for the loss of
the trailer. See Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Cos., 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724
(1968) (Crockett, CJ., concurring specially),
and Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 12 Utah
2d 107, 363 P.2d 498 (1961) on "law of the
case."
The judgment below is affirmed and the
case is remanded to determine a reasonable
amount of attorney fees which Petty Motor
is entitled to under its agreement for responding to this appeal. Costs on appeal
are awarded to Petty Motor.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.

BIG K CORPORATION, dba Diamond
Transport, Plaintiff,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; Brent H. Cameron, Chairman,
David R. Irvine, Commissioner, and
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Defendants.
No. 18643.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 28, 1984.
Public Service Commission denied application for certificate of convenience and
necessity to transport by motor common
carrier fluids used in drilling oil wells, and
applicant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) finding that existing service was adequate because no shipper was wholly deprived of service was
based on an erroneous legal construction of
the "deficiency of service" standard, and
(2) it was error to strike testimony of petroleum engineer that more water haulers
6*9 P 2 d - 3 0
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were needed merely because it was elicited
as result of a Commissioner's question.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Public Utilities «=>194
Court accords ruling of Public Service
Commission differing degrees of deference
according to the nature of the issues reviewed in a proceeding on a petition for
issuance of certificate of convenience and
necessity. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.
2. Public Utilities «=»194
With respect to factual issues, scope of
review of ruling of Public Service Commission is whether the findings are supported
by substantial evidence and the court will
not reweigh conflicting evidence and determines only whether there is substantial
evidence to support a finding. U.C.A.1953,
54-0-5.
3. Public Utilities G=>194
In determining whether Public Service
Commission correctly construed general
principles of law, whether statutory or case
law, a reviewing court generally does not
defer to the Commission. U.C.A.1953, 546-5.
4. Public Utilities «=>194
Even with respect to Public Service
Commission's construction of its organic
statute, a reviewing court will not defer
unless the Commission by virtue of expertise and experience is in a superior position
to give effect to the regulator}' objectives
to be achieved or the terms of the statute
make clear that the Commission was intended to have broad discretion in construing those terms. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.
5. Automobiles <3=»83
In determining whether public interest
and necessity are served by additional motor common carrier service, the Public Service Commission must consider numerous
factors and must weigh the benefits to be
derived from increased competition, such as
the potential beneficial effect on rates, customer service, the acquisition of equipment
more suitable to customer needs, the efficient use of equipment, greater responsive-
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ness in meeting future shipper needs, and
greater efficiency in the use of route structures and interlining arrangements. U.C.
A.1953, 54-6-5.
6. Carriers *=»8
In ruling on application for certificate
of convenience and necessity, the Public
Service Commission may not wholly disregard the effect that additional competition
may have on existing carriers and must not
undercut the ability of efficiently operated
carriers to achieve sufficient financial stability so that they can provide reliable service, comply with public safety regulations
and conform with other business regulatory policies that further economic development and growth of new industries. U.C.
A.1953, 54-6-5.
7. Carriers s=>8
Fact that additional competition will
divert revenues from existing carriers is
not a valid reason by itself to justify denial
of additional authority, i.e., certificate of
convenience and necessity. U.C.A.1953,
54-6-5.
8. Public Utilities <&=»113
Ultimate criterion against which all relevant factors are evaluated in ruling on
application for certificate of convenience
and necessity is the public good and convenience. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.
9. Carriers «=>8
Except where market conditions require otherwise, such as where markets are
too small to support an additional carrier or
a new carrier seeks to "cream" a market to
the detriment of other carriers or small
shippers, competition is almost always an
affirmative factor in furthering the public
convenience and necessity. U.C.A.1953,
54-6-5.
10. Automobiles «=>78
Construction of term "public convenience and necessity" as meaning to foster
competition, when feasible, is not inconsistent with statute providing that Public Service Commission should prevent unnecessary duplication of services between motor
common carriers. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-4, 546-5.

11. Automobiles *»78
Statute requiring Public Service Commission to prevent unnecessary duplication
of services between motor common carriers
was not intended to freeze monopoly or
tightly oligopolistic markets irrespective of
the benefits that competition may provide
and it is not the policy of that statute to
favor automatically the fewest number of
carriers possible in a given market and
duplication of services is not "unnecessary" if competition will provide a better
service or lower rates. U.C.A.1953, 54-64.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
12. Automobiles e»78
Statute requiring Public Service Commission to prevent unnecessary duplication
of services between motor common carriers
was intended to prevent the kind of predatory, below-cost competition that threatens
the adequacy of service and the soundness
of the transportation industry. U.C.A.
1953, 54-6-4.
13. Automobiles <3=>83
Requirement that applicant for motor
common carrier certificate of convenience
and necessity prove that additional service
is consonant with the public convenience
and necessity may be met by showing inadequacy of the current service or the need to
fulfill increased future demand for motor
carrier services. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.
14. Automobiles <$=>78
Inadequacy of service by present motor carriers is a broader concept than simply the absence of service and the service
may be inadequate, for purpose of issuing
additional certificates of convenience and
necessity, if it does not meet the reasonable
needs of consignors or consignees and "inadequacy of service" encompasses both
substandard service and service that is subject to improvement and inadequacy need
not necessarily be established by evidence
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of actual shipper dissatisfaction with existing carrier service. U.C.A.I953, 54-6-5.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
15. Automobiles *»78
Existing motor carrier service may be
inadequate, so as to warrant additional certificates of convenience and necessity, simply by comparison with improvements offered by the applicant's proposed service.
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.

19. Automobiles *=»&3
Required finding, as predicate to
granting of certificate of convenience and
necessity, that the public convenience and
necessity require the proposed motor common carrier service must necessarily include the possibility that granting of the
application will be "detrimental to the best
interests of the people of the State," within
meaning of statute. U.C.A.1953, -54-6-5.

16. Automobiles *=»83
Public Service Commission's finding
that existing service concerning transportation of fluids used in drilling oil wells was
adequate because no shipper was wholly
deprived of service was based on an error
of law, requiring a reevaluation under the
proper standard of evidence that service
proposed by applicant for certificate of convenience and necessity would benefit those
shippers located in the northern and south
central regions of the state and that long
hauls from terminals of existing carriers to
the shippers result in less efficient service
and greater expense for the shippers in an
industry in which time is a matter of considerable importance. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.

Merlin 0. Baker, A. Robert Thorup,
Irene Warr, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen
Lewis, C. Reed Brown, William S. Richards,
Mark Boyle, Donald B. Holbrook, Elizabeth
Haslam, Randall N. Skanchy, Salt Lake
City, for defendants.

17. Automobiles e=»83
It was error for Public Service Commission, in ruling on application for certificate of convenience and necessity to transport fluids used in drilling oil wells, to
strike testimony of petroleum engineer
that more water haulers were needed in
Utah as opinion had an adequate foundation arising from witness' experience and
expertise in the industry and opinion was
not objectionable on ground that witness
gave it in response to a Commissioner's
question. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.
18. Public Utilities <s=»167
It is duty of Public Service Commission
to see that relevant evidence is not ignored
in an application for certificate of convenience and necessity and the Commission,
though it acts in a quasi-judicial function
and must be impartial as between the parties, need not take a passive stance in protecting the public interest. U.C.A.1953,
54-6-5.

STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiff, Big K Corporation dba Diamond Transport, a motor common earner,
applied to the Utah Public Service Commission for a certificate of convenience and
necessity to transport fluids used in drilling
wells for oil over irregular routes between
points within the state of Utah, with the
exception of Uintah and Duchesne Counties. The PSC denied the application, holding that Big K had failed to show that the
service provided by existing carriers was
deficient. On this appeal, Big K argues
that the Commission misconstrued the "deficiency of service" standard and therefore
failed to determine whether Big K's proposed service would provide a better service to shippers in northern and central
Utah than is provided by the existing carriers. W7e hold that the Commission erred as
a matter of law in its construction of the
"deficiency of service" standard.
I.
Prior to its application to the Utah PSC,
Big K had obtained authority from the
Public Service Commission of Wyoming to
transport drilling fluids between points
within the state of Wyoming. Big K was
also authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to transport drilling
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fluids between the states of Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Idaho.
Big K's application for intrastate authority in Utah was protested by eight drilling
fluid carriers.1 Its proposal was to use one
of its existing terminals in Evanston, Wyoming, to service recently developed northeastern Utah oilfields located in the newly
discovered and partially developed Overthrust Belt area, and it also proposed to
open a new terminal in Holden, Utah, to
service new drilling activity in central
Utah. The terminals of all but one of the
protestants are located near Vernal in proximity to the eastern Utah oil fields, which
are old, established areas of oil exploration
and production.2 Those fields are separated from the northeastern areas by the Uintah Mountains. Land transportation between Vernal and the latter fields is long
and round-about.
Big K operates a fleet of thirty-one
trucks for hauling drilling fluids. Drilling
activity has increased in Utah significantly
over the past twenty years. From 1976 to
1981, drilling activity increased statewide
some 165^. The Commission found that
drilling activity would likely continue to
increase in the future because of the discoveries in the Overthrust Belt which is
thought to extend the length of the state.
The Overthrust Belt is one of the major oil
discoveries in the continental United States
during the past several decades.
In support of its application, Big K adduced the testimony of six shippers who
supported the proposed service. Three oil
drillers who operated in areas distant from
Vernal testified that the long distances the
drilling fluids were hauled had caused them
delays, increased their expenses, and compounded the problems of adequate water
service. Big K also adduced evidence that
oil drilling in Utah had increased consistently over the past two decades and was
likely to continue to increase.
I. They arc Black Hills Trucking; Duanc Hall
Trucking, D E Casada Rig & Construction Contractor; Hay Hot Oil, Inc.; Liquid Transport;
Matador Services; Sunco Trucking Co.; and
Target Trucking, Inc.

The protestants sought to establish that
no need existed for additional service in
northeastern and central Utah. Their evidence indicated that they were able and
willing to provide additional service to the
shippers located in the areas Big K proposed to serve, that their equipment for
transporting oil drilling fluids was underutilized, and that they had not refused service to any shipper.
In a two-to-one decision, with Commissioner David Irvine concurnng and dissenting, the Commission held that Big K met
the requisite fitness criteria to qualify for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Specifically, Big K was found to be
financially stable; its prior operations were
in compliance with the various regulatory
provisions of the law, and its operational
capabilities were sufficient to enable it to
perform the proposed service. The Commission also ruled, however, that there was
no public need for the additional service.
The Commission stated:
We now turn to the second requirement, public need for the proposed service. This requirement normally causes
new applicants the most trouble. It puts
a considerable burden on an applicant
because, if the proposed service duplicates that existing, we have consistently
held that an applicant must show either
deficiencies in the existing service (something more than sporadic, de minimis
failures), or a prospective growth in the
market sufficiently substantial to justify
additional service
What may be loosely termed the "deficiency in service" requirement does afford existing carriers considerable protection from increased competition. It
also protects their investment in operating rights, which may be substantial.
In addition, the Commission found that
"drilling activity in Utah will likely continue to increase, [and the] potential need for
additional service of the type sought in the
2. One earner has its main terminal in San Juan
County, in the southeastern corner of the state.
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application [and] the present and immediately foreseeable level of activity" did not
indicate a need for additional service. The
Commission also found that the equipment
of the protestants was under-utilized and
that they had not refused to service the
shipping public. The Commission concluded that Big K had failed to show a public
need for the proposed service because
there was no "deficiency of service."
Commissioner Irvine concurred in the
findings and conclusion that Big K met the
fitness criteria, but dissented on the standard to be applied in determining public
need. In his view, the majority misconstrued this Courts holding in Lake Shore
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8
Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958). Specifically, he disagreed with the majority that
Lake Shore required a finding of a "deficiency of service," at least as the Commission construed that term, before the Commission could grant new authority. He
contended that a deficiency of service was
only one factor among several to be
weighed in determining whether public convenience and necessity required the authorization of new service.
II.
[1-4] It is axiomatic that we accord the
ruling of the Public Service Commission
differing degrees of deference according to
the nature of the issue reviewed. Utah
Department of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Commission, Utah, 658
P.2d 601, 608-09 (1983). With respect to
factual issues, the scope of our inquiry is
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. We will not reweigh conflicting evidence. It is our duty to determine only whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding. See id. at
608-09; Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, Utah, 672
P.2d 728, 729 (1983). In determining
whether the Commission correctly construed general principles of law, whether
statutory or case law, we generally do not
defer to the Commission. Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
3. See Laws of Utah 2935, chapters 65 and 66.

Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601,
608 (1983); Utah Light & Traction Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99,
118 P.2d 683 (1941); Mulcahy v. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117
P.2d 298 (1941). Cf Trotta v. Department
of Employment Security, Utah, 664 P.2d
1195,1198 (1983). Even with respect to the
Commission's construction of its organic
statute, we do not defer unless the Commission by virtue of expertise and experience with the regulatory scheme is in a
superior position to give effect to the regulatory objectives to be achieved or the
t^rms of the statute make clear that the
Commission was intended to have broad
discretion in construing those terms. Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 1312,
1316 (1982).
In reviewing the Commission's application of the "deficiency of service" test in
the motor carrier industry, we are concerned with the terms of the governing
statute and our own case law construing
that statute with respect to the extent to
which the statute contemplated that regulation rather than competition wTas to be
relied upon to further the public interest in
motor common carriage.
III.
The Motor Vehicle Act of 1935 subjected
the motor carrier industry to governmental
regulation as the primary means of protecting and furthering the public interest.3
Prior thereto, the policy of the state wras to
rely upon the forces of competition in a
free market place, subject to the general
protection of the antitrust laws, to provide
reasonable rates and adequate service.
Und^r the new statutory policy, free entry
into the market place was displaced by
entry wholly controlled by the Public Service Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5
empowers the Commission to authorize
new service by granting a certificate of
convenience and necessity if the Commission finds that "the public convenience and
necessity require the proposed sen'ice or
any part thereof." "Necessity" means
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"reasonably necessary and not absolutely
imperative
Any service or improvement which is desirable for the public welfare and highly important to the public
convenience may properly be regarded as
necessary." Mulcahy v. Public Service
Commission, 101 Utah 245, 250-51, 117
P.2d 298, 300-01 (1941).
The issue in this case is whether the
public convenience and necessity would be
served by granting new authority to Big K
or whether existing carriers should be protected from that competition. Lake Shore
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8
Utah 2d 293, 297, 333 P.2d 1061, 1063
(1958), set out the following test for determining whether new common carrier authority should issue:
Our understanding of the statute is
that there should be a showing that existing services are in some measure inadequate, or that public need as to the
potential of business is such that there is
some reasonable basis in the evidence to
believe that public convenience and necessity justify the additional proposed
service.
Accord Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, Utah, 672
P.2d 728, 730 (1983); PBI Freight Service
v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 598
P.2d 1352 (1979); Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d
298 (1941).

be free from competition, to have a monopoly against the public/' The role of competition in motor carrier regulation has been
long recognized by other courts as well.
In Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 83, 91, 78 S.Ct. 173, 178, 2
L.Ed.2d 117 (1957), the United States Supreme Court stated a long-standing policy
applicable to the regulation of motor common carriers:
"[N]o carrier is entitled to protection
from competition in the continuance of a
service that fails to meet a public need,
nor, by the same token, should the public
be deprived of a new and improved service because it may divert some traffic
from other carriers.M
Cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67, 86, 64 S.Ct. 370, 380, 88
L.Ed. 544 (1944) ("the Motor Carrier Act is
to be administered with an eye to affirmatively improving transportation facilities,
not merely to preserving existing arrangements ..."). See also Chief Freightlines
Co., Extension Dallas, Texas, 126 MCC
794 (1977). "Even where Congress has
chosen Government regulation as the primary device for protecting the public interest, a policy of facilitating competitive market structure and performance is entitled
to consideration." Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 298, 95 S.Ct. 438,
448, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974).

[5] In determining whether the public
interest and necessity are served by additional service, the Commission must consider numerous factors. It must weigh the
benefits to be derived from increased competition, such as the potential beneficial
effect upon rates, customer service, the
acquisition of equipment more suitable to
customer needs, the efficient use of equipment, greater responsiveness in meeting
future shipper needs, and greater efficiency in the use of route structures and interlining arrangements. In Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 459, 466, 135 P.2d 915, 918
(1943), this Court stated that "regulated
competition is as much within the provisions of [§ 54-6-5] as is regulated monopoly
No one can have a vested right to

[6,7] Of course, the Commission may
not wholly disregard the effect that additional competition may have on existing
carriers. See Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 296,
333 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1958); Salt Lake &
Utah Railroad Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 106 Utah 403, 408, 149 P.2d
647, 649 (1944); Utah Light & Traction
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101
Utah 99, 113-15, 118 P.2d 683, 690-91
(1941). The Commission must not undercut
the ability of efficiently operated carriers
to achieve sufficient financial stability so
that they can provide reliable service, comply with public safety regulations, and conform with other business regulatory policies that further economic development and
the growth of new industries. See gener-
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ally Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc.
v. Bennett, supra; Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, supra. Nevertheless,
the fact that additional competition will divert revenues from existing carriers is not
a valid reason by itself to justify a denial of
additional authority.

nience and necessity. That may be demonstrated by showing the inadequacy of the
current service or the need to fulfill increased future demand for motor carrier
services. E.g., Harry L. Young & Sons,
Inc., supra; Mulcahy v. Public Service
Commission, supra.

[8,9] The ultimate criterion against
which all relevant factors are to be evaluated is the "public good and convenience,"
Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 106 Utah 403,
408, 149 P.2d 647, 649 (1944), not the existing carriers' convenience and necessity.
See Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v.
Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 120, 339 P.2d 1011,
1014-15 (1959). Except where market conditions require otherwise, such as where
markets are too small to support an additional carrier, or a new carrier seeks to
"cream" a market to the detriment of other
carriers or small shippers, competition is
almost always an affirmative factor in furthering the public convenience and necessity.
[10-12] Our construction of the term
"public convenience and necessity" to foster competition when feasible is not inconsistent with § 54-6-4. That section provides that the Commission should prevent
unnecessary duplication of services between motor common carriers. The section
was not intended to freeze monopoly or
tightly oligopolistic markets irrespective of
the benefits competition may provide. It is
not the policy of § 54-6-4 to favor automatically the fewest number of carriers
possible in a given market. Competition
necessarily always involves duplication of
services. Duplication of services is not
"unnecessary" if competition will provide a
better service or lower rates. Rather,
§ 54-6-4 was intended to prevent the kind
of predator}', below-cost competition that
threatens the adequacy of service and the
soundness of the transportation industry.

[14] Inadequacy of service is, however,
a broader concept than simply the absence
of service. Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 2 Utah 2d 23, 30,
268 P.2d 990, 995 (1954). A service may be
inadequate if it does not meet the reasonable needs of consignors or consignees.
"[A] service is not necessarily adequate
because [a] community can 'get by,' can
conduct its business without further or additional service/' Mulcahy, supra, 101
Utah at 252,117 P.2d at 301. Thus, "inadequacy of service," encompasses both substandard service and service that is subject
to improvement. Inadequacy of service
need not necessarily be established by evidence of actual shipper dissatisfaction with
existing carrier service.
[15] Uintah Freight Lines v. Public
Service Commission, 118 Utah 544, 223
P.2d 408 (1950), is clearly on point. It
established the proposition that the existing service may be inadequate simply by
comparison with improvements offered by
an applicant's proposed service. The applicant proposed providing common carrier
service from a terminal in Price, Utah, to
serve shippers located in eastern Utah.
Both of the applicant's chief competitors
had their terminals in Salt Lake City, Utah,
a considerable distance both in time and
miles from the shippers to be served. The
Court sustained the Commission's grant of
new authority because the applicant could
"offer shippers in that area service with
much less delay than . . . carriers which
[had] their equipment stationed in Salt
Lake City . . . . " Id. at 551, 223 P.2d at
411.

[13] Obviously, however, the policy of
the Motor Carrier Act is not unrestrained
competition. Free market entry is expressly foreclosed. Pursuant to § 54-6-5, all
new entrants must prove that additional
service is consonant with the public conve-

PB1 Freight Sennce v. Public Service
Commission, Utah, 598 P.2d 1352 (1979),
also sustained the Commission's grant of
new authority because the applicant, PBI,
could provide better service than the certificated carriers. PBI had more of a type of
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equipment needed by the shippers served
than the protestants and also provided
through service, while the protestant carriers had to interline with other carriers to
offer a similar service. Compare Lewis v.
Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264
(1966) (quicker service); Lake Shore Motor
Coach Lines v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339
P.2d 1011 (1959) (new type of service); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915
(1943) (store door pick up and delivery).
[16] In the instant case, the evidence
before the Commission indicated that the
applicant's proposed service would benefit
those shippers located in the northern and
south central regions of the state. The
long hauls from the terminals of the existing earners to those shippers result in less
efficient service and greater expense for
the shippers in an industry in which time is
a matter of considerable importance in the
service rendered. Commissioner Irvine
noted that the service would "be considerably more convenient to [Summit and Rich
Counties in northern Utah, western Utah,
and south central Utah], and service could
be provided more rapidly when necessary.
There are few enterprises so costly or more
illustrative of the maxim 'time is money'
than is exploration for oil and gas."

erred in striking the testimony of Michael
Minder, a petroleum engineer with the
Utah State Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, that more water haulers were needed
in Utah. The opinion had an adequate
foundation arising from Minder's experience and expertise in the petroleum industry and was not objectionable on the
ground that Minder gave it in response to a
Commissioner's question. It is indeed the
duty of the Commission to see to it that
relevant evidence is not ignored. The Commission, though it acts in a quasi-judicial
function and must be impartial as between
the parties, need not take a passive stance
in protecting the public interest. Thus, the
Commission erred in striking the testimony
because it was elicited as a result of a
Commissioner's question.

IV.
[17,18] Big K raises three other issues.
First, it contends that the Commission

[19] Second, the last sentence of § 546-5 provides that the Commission shall not
grant a certificate of public convenience
and necessity if it would "be detrimental to
the best interests of the people of the State
of Utah." Big K argues that the Commission erred in not making such a finding.
We think the Commission did not err. By
its terms, § 54-6-5 requires the Commission to find, as a predicate to granting a
certificate, that the "public convenience
and necessity require the proposed service." That finding must necessarily preclude "the possibility that the granting of
the application will be 'detrimental to the
best interests of the people of the state of
Utah' within the meaning of the statute."
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, Utah, 672 P.2d 728,
732 (1983).
Finally, Big K argues that the Commission found that a potential need for future
service exists and that Big K is entitled as
a matter of law to the requested authority
to fill that need. That conclusion does not
necessarily follow.4 Whether Big K or ex-

4. The Commission found:
8. Drilling activity in the state of Utah has
expanded consistently during the past 20
years. In the five-year period from 1976
through 1981, drilling activity has increased
statewide some 165%. From 1960 through

1981, the Notices of Intent to Drill which have
been filed with the State increased 720% Existing carriers have been able to meet the
increased demand.
9. The record reflects indications that
drilling activity in Utah will likely continue to

In denying Big K's application, the Commission erred in its failure to properly define the "inadequacy of service" standard.
Thus, the Commission's finding that the
existing service was adequate solely because no shipper was wholly deprived of
service was based on an error of law. As a
consequence, the order of the Commission
must be set aside and the case remanded
for the Commission to reevaluate the evidence and make new findings in light of
this opinion.

KUTV, INC. v. UTAH STATE BD. OF EDUC.

Utah

1357

Cite u 689 ?26 13S7 (Utah 1984)

isting carriers Bhould fill future needs depends upon the Commission's determination of all factors bearing upon the public
convenience and necessity, including the
desirable effects that may be produced by
additional competition.
Reversed and remanded for further consideration.
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., and ERNEST
F. BALDWIN, Jr., District Judge, concur.
HALL, CJ., having disqualified himself,
does not participate herein; BALDWIN,
District Judge, sat.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate.
(o
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KUTV, INC., a Nevada corporation, and
Karl Idsvoog, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
an agency of the State of Utah; Dr.
Waiter Talbot, Utah State Superintendent of Public Instruction; Board of Education of the Box Elder School District, a body corporate of the State of
Utah; Morgan Hawkes, Superintendent
of the Box Elder School District, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18799.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 12, 1984.
State Board of Education elicited information concerning alleged discrimination in
school district by means of questionnaires,
and subsequently released summary of survey results. When Board refused to release actual completed questionnaires, reporter brought action to obtain disclosure.
increase. The Overthrust Belt, which extends
the length of the State, is one of the most
promising areas for the drilling of hydrocarbons in the United States. Onl> 10% of the
Overthrust Belt has been explored for hydrocarbons, and it is possible a major find in
Utah could cause an explosive growth in drill-

The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Philip R. Fishier, J., entered summary
judgment in favor of Board, and reporter
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ.,
held that: (1) questionnaires were not subject to disclosure under Archives and
Records Service and Information Practices
Act, but (2) questionnaires were public
records under Public and Private Writings
Act, and case was properly remanded for in
camera inspection of questionnaires, which
were to be released unless trial court found
that it was impossible to edit questionnaire
responses to preserve confidentiality
and/or that release of documents would be
contrary to public interest.
Remanded.
Howe, J., dissented and filed statement.
1. Records e=>54
Questionnaires which had gathered information concerning alleged discrimination in school district pursuant to State
Board of Education survey were not ''data
on individuals" to be kept on "permanent
or semi-permanent basis," and thus were
not subject to disclosure under Archives
and Records Service and Information Practices Act. U.C.A. 1953, 63-2-61(9).
2. Records <s=*50
Policy reflected in Utah Public and Private Writings Act is that records be kept
open for public inspection in order to prevent secrecy in public affairs, but rights
created by Act are not absolute, and are
subject to implied rule of reason. U.C.A.
1953, 78-26-2.
3. Records <s=>64
Breach of promise of confidentiality
standing alone is not of sufficient harm to
public interest to prevent disclosure of public records under Public and Private Writing activity. There are thus indications of a
potential need for additional service of the
type sought in this application. The evidence
in this case is, however, that the present and
immediate!) foreseeable level of actmt> does
not so indicate.
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ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
FOB RECONSIDERATION
AND REVERSAL
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in Intrastate Commerce.
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Scott M. Matheson
James M. Elegante

For

Spreader Specialists,
Inc., Applicant

"

W. S. Hatch Company,
Protestant

"

Matlack, Inc., Energy
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Thomas M. Zarr
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By the Commission:
Following the Commission's Report and Order in this
matter,

issued

April

12,

1995,

Spreader

Specialists, Inc.,

hereafter called •'Applicant", filed its Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal May 2, 1985.

Memoranda were filed and the

matter argued August 6, 1985 and September 24, 1985. The Commission, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following Discussion, Conclusions of Law, and the Order based thereon.
DISCUSSION AMD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

At the time this case was heard, the decision

CASE NO. 34-663-01

the Supreme Court of Utah in Big K Corporation vs. Public Service
Commission of Utah, 689 P.?d 1349

(1984* had not been issued.

However, the Commission is necessarily concerned with the potential impact of that decision on our response to the Applicant's
Petition for Reconsideration and Reversal.

Our reading of the

Court's decision does not impel us to the conclusion that the
Court has mandated a de facto deregulation of the transportation
industry

based

on a presumption

serves the public interest.

that

competition

necessarily

Rather, it appears to us, and the

parties apparently share our view, that the Court established a
balancing test for the grant of authority, in which the public
benefits to be anticipated from increased competition are important factors for us to consider, but are not per se dispositive.
Against the prospective benefits must be weighed the prospective
detriment.

One facet of that detriment would be the impairment

of the ability of efficiently-run

carriers to maintain

service at existing levels of performance and safety.

their

Of neces-

sity, since we are dealing with possible future events, findings
in regard to such impairment must be speculative.

For the same

reason, findings regarding potential benefits must be likewise
speculative.
2.

Applicant argues that in light of the Big K deci-

sion, we

should

abandon

deciding

authority

applications

legislative approach.
in

this

context,

a strict

quasi-judicial
and

approach

substitute

a

to

quasi-

We are not clear how the two would differ

since

a

necessarily

speculative

balancing

CASE NO.

IH-WV-,

- 3 of factors is mandated by the Court, irrespective of how—quasijudicial or quasi-legislative—that balancing is characterized.
If Applicant is arguing that Big K establishes a presumption in
favor of an applicant, we do not so read the opinion.

Certainly

the Court did not overrule any of its prior pronouncements on
this issue, and indeed it cited several of them with apparent
approval.
3.

In reviewing the record of this case, we are not

persuaded that the Administrative Law Judge erred in his perception of the facts and the public interest.

It is our conclusion

that he properly balanced the merits and demerits of additional
competition and we specifically reaffirm his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and his Order based thereon.
4.
greater

If we

are

consideration

direction

from

the

to give

than
Court

an

applicant

for authority

this, we believe we need
or

the

Legislature.

clearer

Applicant's

petition for reversal must be dismissed.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Petition
of Spreader Specialists, Inc., for reconsideration and reversal
be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.
DATED
November, 1985.

at

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah,

this

5th

day

o'
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(SEAL)

I si

3rent H. Cameron, Chairman

/si

James M. Byrne, Commissioner

Is!

Brian T. Stewarts Commissioner

Attest:
Is! Georgia B. Peterson
Executive Secretary

COMMISSION COMMENTS
The Commission must base its decisions on statutory
construction as guided by a long string of court decisions of
which the Big K decision is but the most recent.
who

interpret

the Big K decision

as a major

There are those
change

in the

regulation of the common carrier industry in Utah, which will
dramatically reduce restrictions on market entry in future cases.
We

do

not

believe

that

Big

K

has

wrought

such

a chang2.

Fundamental changes in regulation of utilities including motor
transport, should come from the Legislature or from the Supreme
Court with a clear invalidation of prior statutory construction.
We

are

aware

of

the

current

Legislature to study the transportation
legislation with
support

such

a deregulatory

legislative

information requested.

flavor.

efforts

with

efforts

within

the

industry and consider
The Commission
any

assistance

will
or

• BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In t>c natter of the the Application Of SPREADER SPECIALISTS,
INC., for Authority to Operate
as a Motor Carrier of Property
in* Intrastate Commerce.

CASE NO. 84-663-0:

)
)
)
)
)

REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED: April 12,
Appearances:
James M. Elegante
and Michael L. Larsen

For

Spreader Specialists,
Applicant

Thomas M. Zarr

K. S. Hatch Co. ,
Protestant

Robert L. Stevens

Matlack, Inc.;
Energy Express, Inc.;
Clark Tank Lines, Inc.,
Protestants

Mark L. Moench
Assistant Attorney General

Division of Public Util: t i e s
Department of Business
Peculation, State of Ut;

By the Commission:
r\?e>A h.\r
rsO
a r\ n pub
— i *v
Pursuant to notice duly served
by mail
and

^ * C a 1 1 C r. ,

the dbove-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing the :••::.
da" cf July, 1224,

befcre A. Robert Thurman, Administrative La-.;

Judge for the Commission, at the Commission Offices, 16 0 East 3?:
South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Additional evidence v;as ta':er. the

following days through July 20, 1984, and on August 1, 2, 3, ~r.~
7,

1984.

Simultaneous

briefs were

tendered, and

the matter

submitted, October 3, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge, having
been

fully advised

in the premises, now enters the follcv:ing

Appendix "C"
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He;vt containing recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law. ?~d the Order based thereon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Spreader

Specialists,

Inc.,

hereafter

called

"Applicant", is an Idaho corporation, qualified to do business in
the State of Utah, and having its principal place of business at
Korth Salt Lake, Utah.
from this Commission.

Applicant presently holds no authority
However, Applicant has leased its equip-

ment, complete with drivers, to Utah certificated carriers since
1976, and it has so operated in Utah.
ly

leased

to Matlack, Inc.,

protestant herein.

Applicant has most recent-

(hereafter

called

"Matlack"), a

Applicant does hold authority from the Idaho

Public Service Commission to operate as a common carrier by motor
vshicle

transporting

liquid

petroleum

between all points in that state.

and

petroleum

products

Applicant also has authority

from the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to transport
petroleum and petroleum products, and non-petroleum bulk liquid
-".•edicts used in road construction, between points in Montana,
/Jycm.ir.g, Utah, Arizona, Tew Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas,
C'lcrado, California, Idaho, Nevada, Washington and Oregon.
2.

Applicant originally sought authority to transport

"petroleum and petroleum products, and such commodities as are
used in road construction over irregular routes from and between
all points and places in the State of Utah."

The application was

subsequently amended, *and the amended application seeks authority
to

operate

"as

a

common

carrier

by

motor

vehicle

for the

-3-

transportation of liquid petroleum and liquid petroleum products
(except

propane

and

butane),

in

bulk,

in

tank

vehicles

over

irregular routes from and between all points and places in the
State of Utah,"
3.
Company,

The application is opposed by Katlack; W. S. Hatch

(hereafter

(hereafter called
called

"Energy").

this Commission

called

"Hatchco");

Clark

Tank

Lines, Inc.

"Clark"); and Energy Express, Inc.
All

of

and hold

the protestants

are

(hereafter

certificated

by

authority which conflicts, in varying

degrees, with that sought by Applicant.
4.

Applicant

operates a fleet of 22 tank trucks and

tank trailers capable of hauling liquid petroleum and petroleum
products.

Nine of the truck and trailer combinatiens are spe-

cially equipped with modern asphalt spreading devices and tv:c cf
the

truck

and

transporting

trailer

refined

combinations

petroleum

are

products.

ment, as well as the spreader-equipped
may be used
products.
condition.

specially
The

trucks

equipped

remaining

fcr

equip-

(to some extents

for transporting various types of liquid pet:r:leu~

Applicant
Applicnt

maintains

its equipment

in good

operating

represents it will file insurance certifi-

cates, annual reports, and it will publish tariffs as required by
law and it will use qualified, skilled
its

operations.

It

maintains

a

and licensed drivers in

safety

and

driver

training

program and will continue to do so if its application is crar.ted.
Ey virtue of its operations under its Idaho and ICC authority, as
well as its activities as equipment lessor to Utah-certificated

CASE NO. 84-663-01
-4c . i e r s , Applicant has acquired experience and expertise in the
car;.>ge of commodities for which it seeks authority.

Accord-

ingly, it is fit operationally.
5.

Protestants have raised some question as to Appli-

cant's regulatory fitness, but we find no evidence of bad faith
or willful violation of applicable statute or rule and do not
find Applicant disqualified on grounds of regulatory fitness.
6.

The authority Applicant seeks would involve render-

ing four distinct, though related, types of service, viz transporting

liquid

asphalt, distributing

the

same

at

job sites,

transporting crude petroleum for well sites to refineries, and
transporting refined products

(distillates) from refineries to

customers.
7.

To this point, as implies in Applicant's corporate

name, Applicant has devoted most of its time and resources to
presiding

asphalt

transportation

and

spreading

service.

The

spreading operation is distinct from the transportation, involves
a --ostantial degree of skill and training by the operator, and
r-?^u;res

specialized

equipment.

Spreading

as

such,

is

not

subj3-t to Commission regulation; however, to attempt to provide
a

spreading

service

without

the

revenue would be cost prohibitive.

concomitant

transportation

The spreading equipment, 'once

installed, cuts down the payload a tanker would otherwise be able
to haul, makes the rig more prone to damage and wear, and otherwise renders its use in other than spreading operations less than
desirable on economic grounds.

Furthermore, the season in which

•5sucr equipment receives substantial use in Utah normally extends,
at r.c£t, from May through October, with the peak months being
July, August, and September.

The spreader equipment is costly,

and its acquisition is not economically justified unless it can
be fully utilized during the season.
8,

Owing

to

this

seasonality

of

spreader

demand,

Applicant has, historically, gone through an annual "boom and
bustM cycle in which, if it is to survive, it has had to accrue
substantially its entire revenues during the summer season and
dissipate the same to keep the firm in existence the rest of the
year.

In the course of its operations, however, Applicant has

won considerable customer loyalty, and despite the seasonality
handicap has been profitable, marginally, for all but two years.
The presentation of Applicant's financial .data at the hearing was
somewhat complicated by Applicant's use of a cash, rather than
accrual, accounting method.

Nevertheless, we find adequate data

was presented, and the results of our analysis of the same are
contained in Exhibits A and B annexed hereto and incorporated by
this reference.

Though the balance sheet in Exhibit B shrvs a

questionable Hquick" ratio, for the reasons set forth hereafter,
we do not find Applicant financially unfit.
9.

A precipitating factor in Applicant's deciricr tc

seek authority was a change in the terms under which Matlack
proposed

to

lease

Applicant's

equipment.

Matlack

recently

purchased its intranstate Utah authority from Pacific Interr.cuntain Express (PIE).

Applicant had been leasing its equipment to
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and

continued

aut;.rity.

the

arrangement

when

Matlack

acquired

the

Under the terms of the PIE lease, PIE retained 11

percent of the revenues generated by Applicant's equipment and
remitted the rest as lease payments.

Matlack proposed to raise

the retained percentage to 13 percent.
did,

in exchange

for

the

retained

PIE, and later Matlack,

percentage, perform

other

services in addition to allowing Applicant to operate under the
aegis of their authority.

The services included billing, col-

lection, safety instruction, and like overhead items.

Matlack

claims it also includes marketing services for its lessors, but
at least as far as asphalt spreading and hauling is concerned,
the major marketing burden has fallen on Applicant's shoulders,
and

it

appears

to

have

borne

it with

substantial

success.

Matlack discontinued the safety program for its lessors.
10.

Protestants have argued that, taking into consid-

eration the services performed by Matlack, it would cost Applicant more to operate independently than it would even under the
1? percent lease arrangement.

After a careful reading of Appli-

cant's testimony and Protestants' Exhibit 16, we disagree.

It

vrculi clearly be to the Applicant's advantage to have its own
authority.

Further, Applicant's pro forma operating statement,

as we have constructed it in Exhibit A, annexed hereto, indicates
Applicant

should

operations.

enjoy

a comfortable

operating

ratio

Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant

in its
is in a

reasonable, though not exceptionally strong, position operationally.

Accordingly, we find Applicant financially fit.
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11.

A second factor inducing Applicant to seek its own

authrrity is the very seasonality of its primary business.
its spreader equipment
would

of necessity

ease Applicant's

financial

With

idle much of the year, it

problems

substantially

if it

could use its transport equipment to a greater extent the rest of
the year.

One barrier to its so doing is the fact that it would

be competing with its own leases, which is very active in the
petroleum-hauling market.

Although Matlack does have two spreader

equipped rigs stationed in Utah, spreading service as such, ar.d
for that natter asphalt transportation, is not a major part cf
its operations.
been willing

It appears that as a consequence, Matlack has

to let Applicant

business on its own.

pretty much

develop the asphalt

Whether Matlack would be equally complacent

in regard to other types of carriage is questionable.
12.

The application was supported by the testimony cf

15 witnesses, of whom nine were interested

in asphalt service.

Of the six remaining witnesses, four were concerned with transportation of crude petroleum, and the last two with the trar.spcrtation

of

interest
interest

distillates.

One

of

the

witnesses

with

a primary

in the asphalt transportation does ajsc have a limited
in

distillate

naphtha, a petroleum

transportation,

since

his

distillate, as a raw material.

firm

uses

An

addi-

tional substantial number of certificates of support were filed
with or shortly after application.
13.

The primary complaint of the witnesses testifying

in support of asphalt authority was difficulty in getting spreader-
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-8e.~.::-red rigs on a job site on short notice during the busy
sea:-... Coupled with this in several cases was a concern that an
upswing in state road maintenance activities, necessitated by bad
weather

and

problem.

flooding

over

recent

years, would

aggravate the

Seven of the nine witnesses had not attempted to use

all of the carriers now available to them.

Some of the witnesses

explained this on the basis that their business had not been
solicited by anyone but Applicant.
14.

Only two witnesses testified in regard to distil-

late transportation.

Cne complained of consistently late deliv-

eries; however, it transpired that his firm was taking advantage
of a tariffed rate offering a lower rate in exchange for delivery
at the carrier's convenience.

The witness said further, his firm

wojld continue to avail itself of the lower rate even if the
application were granted.

The other witness, testifying for a

major oil company complained of sore delivery and loading problems, including delays and pick-up and delivery of the wrong
pi-- luct.

The failure rate for a short test period immediately

prior to the hearing, however, appears to have been less than two
percent.
15.

In regard to crude petroleum transportation, three

firms testified, one presenting

two witnesses.

The first of

these has experienced no problems, and his firm has not availed
itself fully of the service no available.

His only concern was

that as many carriers as possible be available
second

firm

complained

of

a

lack

of

carrier

to him.
cooperation

The
in

9acceding to a request to install safety rails on the tops of tank
trailers and of having to scramble to meet emergency transportation requirements when the pipeline from the Uintah Basin to
North Salt Lake is down.

The common carriers explained, however,

that installation of the rails would make it difficult, if not
impossible, to load or unload their equipment at other customers1
facilities.

In

regard

to the pipeline

problem,

the witness

conceded that the carriers had worked to alleviate the problem,
and the witness could not cite any real failure in service.
16.

The most serious service complaint came frcm the

witness for a major oil company in regard to crude petroleum
transportation.

His firm buys from a number of producers in

Summit County, and some of the wells concerned fluctuate substantially in the rate at which they produce.

Since the cr.-site

storage is limited, the crude must at times be hauled en shert
notice to avoid shutting in the well.

To compound the prcrler.,

it is not feasible to use trucks from two or mere carriers—one
carrier must

send

frcm

two to four

trucks.

Several

service

failures have occurred, most notably on weekends when the witness's firm's own fleet operations are substantially curtailed,
owing to difficulty in finding competent drivers to wcrk t:.:se
shifts.

The existing common carriers have similar problems en

weekends.
17.

The

witness's

company

operates

a

substantial

proprietary fleet and tenders business to common carriers when
its own fleet is operating at capacity or its trucks lack proper
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Two of the existing carriers have

cff;.*-=d the witness's company a dedicated equipment arrangement
as a means of solving the problem, but the witness1s company has
a policy of not entering into such arrangements.
18.

The only way the witness's demand could be met

would be for the corjr.cn carriers to have two or more pieces of
equipment, with drivers, ready for instant response to a call
that might or might not come.

This does not strike • us as an

economic proposition for any carrier, including the Applicant.
Moreover, given the size of Applicant's fleet, and its primary
interest in asphalt carriage and spreading, we are unable to see
how granting the application could help the shipper's problem at
all during the peak spreading season.

In any event, so long as

Ac-"leant continues to lease to Matlack, the shipper may call
Applicant for service.
19.

The present Utah rate structure for the service for

v:hi~h the authority is sought is competitive, as noted by one of
tr.j supporting shippers, which is even cutting back on its own
rr:-rrietary fleet operations in light of that rate structure.
Applicant

dees not propose to operate

at r^ates below those

effered by the existing carriers.
20.

Of the existing carriers, Matlack is the strongest

financially, it is a very large interstate carrier with a net
worth of $28,000,000, endowing it with ample resources to expand
its Utah fleet as market demand dictates.

Ninety percent of its

Utah operations are conducted under its intra-state authority,
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concreted at a loss.

Accordingly, Matlack does not perceive the

need for additional equipment in the Utah market at present.

It

is willing to continue to use Applicant's equipment as lessee cf
the same.

Should the lease end, Matlack is capable of, though it

made no representation regarding, replacing Applicant's equipment
in the Utah market with its own.
granting

The impact on Matlack cf

the application would be two-fold.

First, it would

immediately lose the profit it derives from Applicant's activities, which, Matlack computes, approximates three percent of the
revenue Applicant's equipment generates.

In terms of Matlack's

overall revenues, this strikes us as negligible.
longer term, Matlack would
crude

and

diversion

distillate
of

face increased

hauling

revenue, the

markets

extent

Second, in the

cor.petiticn in the

and very

of which

is

possibly scr.e
impossible

tc

quantify.
21.

Energy is a Utah-based carrier, holding both ir.ter-

BrS- intra-state

authority.

Approximately

40 percent

cf its

revenues are generated through its Utah intra-state operaticr.s.
It operated at a loss the year prior to the hearing.
Utah

intra-state

granting

revenues

the application.

would

be

How much

subject

to

All cf its

civersicr. by

diversion wculd

actually

eventuate is, of course, impossible to say.
22.

Clark is likewise a Utah-based carrier holding both

inter- and intra-state authority.

Approximately 30 percer.t cf

its revenue derives from its intra-state operations.

Clark has
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it •••-? undertaking

a

substantial

retrenchment,

including

attempt to negotiate a 10 percent payroll reduction.
mately

85

percent

of

Clark's

intra-state

revenues

an

Approxiwould

be

subject to diversion by granting the application; how much actual
diversion there would be is again impossible to say.
23.

Hatchco is a Utah-based carrier, operating both

inter- and intra-state, and maintaining terminals at Woods Cross,
Geneva, Roosevelt, Vernal, Delta, Salina, and Huntington.
1983, Hatchco derived
cellars

earnings of approximately

from its Utah operations, on which

approximately

24 thousand

dollars was

7.49

During
million

a net prcfit of

realized.

Owing

to a

declining transportation market in the coal, uranium, and chemicam. fields, Hatchco operated at a loss . for the first half of
19-.4.

Approximately 1.12 million cellars c r Hatchco revenue is

pcr^ntially divertible by granting the application.
24.

Matlack, Clark, and Hatchco all possess and operate

sr.^sder equipment

adequate to the spreading task.

7.11 have

f/perienced excess equipment capacity during 1983, even in the
use :f their spreader equipment.

Energy likewise has experienced

excess capacity in its transportation equipment.
25.

In the markets involved here, there is no interlin-

ing, and there are no significant back hauls available.
ingly, granting

of

the certificate

is likely

rather than alleviate, inefficient equipment use.

Accord-

to exacerbate,

26.

Applicant

presented

some

evidence

intended

indicate a prospective growth in the markets involved.

to

In the

case of asphalt hauls, the evidence indicates a market decline,
since the major sources of asphalt now appear to exist out of
state in contrast with the situation a few years ago.

Giving

Applicant the maximum benefit of its evidence on growth, the
growth indicated appears insufficient to justify by itself the
granting of the application.
27.

The Division of Public Utilities did not oppose the

application.
CONCLUSIONS or LAV:

The statutory burden to be satisfied in connection with
a common carrier application is set out in Sections 54-6-4 and
54-S-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953.

The governing case law has recently

been collected in Big K Corporation v. Public Service Comr.issicr.,
Opinion, Case No. 1E643, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984).

Our analysis

proceeds in light of that case and its predecessors collected
therein.
Inasmuch as we have not found Applicant disqualified cr.
fitness grounds, we must proceed to consider "convenience and
necessity", taking into consideration the factors listed by the
Court in the Big K decision.

Among the factors listed by the

Court are:
. . . the benefits to be derived from increased competition, such as the potential
beneficial
effect
upon
rates, customer
service, the acquisition of equipment more
suitable to customer needs, the efficient use
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of equipment, greater responsiveness in
meeting future shipper needs, and greater
efficiency in the use of route structures and
interlining arrangements. Opinion, Case No.
18643, at 5.
We are cautioned, however, that:
The Commission must not undercut the ability
of efficiently operated carriers to achieve
sufficient financial stability so that they
can provide reliable service, comply with
public safety regulations, and conform with
other business regulatory policies that
further economic development and the growth
of new industries. id. at 6.
At the outset we note that the supporting shippers,
individually and collectively, have failed to avail themselves
fully of the service now available.

Though there have been,

apparently, seme service problems, with the exception of one
shipper's crude hauls, they appear to have been minimal, and en
z:e

vhole the existing service appears to be adequate and respon-

sive to the reasonable demands put on it.

We are unable tc

perreive that the granting of the application would contribute tc
*•>.-=. solution of meeting a peak demand so seriously in excess of
v.e .rough, in the case of asphalt spreading, or in meeting the
erer-ency needs of one shipper with unusual requirements.
We

have

examined

the evidence

with

respect

to any

substantial benefits to be derived from increased competition and
the beneficial effects, if any, on rates, should the application
be granted.

Given that there are already four serious competi-

tors in the relevant markets, and rates are already so low that
all four have either suffered a loss, or a minimal profit, in
their Utah operations, no rate benefit is to be anticipated.
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no service benefit

is to be

anticipated, whether by way of

additional equipment acquisition or otherwise; on the contrary,
the necessity of retrenchment is likely to lead to decline in
service.

As indicated by Finding No. 25, above, no benefit by

way of interlining or improved use of route structure is to be
anticipated.
We have examined the evidence with a view to determining whether the grant of authority would undercut the ability of
efficiently

operated

carriers

to achieve

sufficient

stability to allow them to provide reliable service.
noteworthy

that

all

four

existing

carriers

find

financial
We find it

their

Utah

operations marginally profitable at best, and seriously unprofitable at worst.

This, despite years of . collective experience.

While we are loathe to conclude Applicant's entry into the market
would so financially impair the existing carriers that they wculc
fine themselves under pressure to cut corners on safety requirements, we cannot blind ourselves to economic realities anc the
real possibility of such occurring.
We must also consider that particularly
relevant
state.
the

here

involve

transportation

to remote

the markets

parts

of the

It would be unfortunate indeed if Applicant's entry into

market

precipitated

the

closure

of any

of

the existing

carriers1 terminals or the curtailment of their operations into
those areas.

Indeed this risk of deterioration of service into

remore parts of the state strongly distinguishes this case from
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ter.i'ai in an area not then served by such a facility.

Id. at

«• •

As our Findings above recognize, we cannot quantify the
likely diversion of revenue from any one carrier.
all

four

have

experienced

lossed

in

their

However, since

Utah

intra-state

operations, there is a substantial danger we are dealing with the
straw capable of breaking the camel's back.

Kith little or no

offsetting benefit in prospect, we choose not to run that risk.
7c put a fourth financially weak carrier in a market now occupied
by three weak carriers and a strong one appears to us to be a
recipe for curtailing competition in the long run, rather than
boosting it.
There is one unique aspect of this case, pointed out by
Applicant, which merits discussion.

Owing to its long associa-

tic.". with first PIE and latterly Katlack, Applicant is in fact
par. of the existing transportation facilities, at lease insofar
a? -sphalt transportation and spreading is concerned.

However,

; t- c:es net follow that Applicant is in any different posture
-han ether seekers of authority.
statutory burden.

Applicant must still meet its

Applicant's past operations as lessor may be

considered, as they have been, for demonstrating experience and
ability, but to accord them more than that would put in jeopardy
the long-standing practice of owner-operator leasing, as well as
open a large loophole in the regulatory scheme.

It may be true

that Applicant's withdrawal from the Utah market would leave a

CAM^
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hclcr we are satisfied, however, that the existing carriers are
cap:r2e of filling it.
Were

the

Utah

operations

of

the

existing

carriers

financially sounder, or were we convinced Applicant's entry into
the market would offer the shipping public real benefit, we would
be inclined to grant the application.

However, on this record,

we conclude the application must be denied.
ORDER
NOV:, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application of Spreader Specialists be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of April,
1985.

/s/A. Robert Thurman
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 12th day cf April, 19E! , as
the Report and Order of the Commission.
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
/s/ James K. Byrne, Commissioner
(SEAL)
Attest:
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson
Executive Secretary

/s/ Brian T. Stewart
Commissioner Pro Tempore

Exhibit A
rONST^UCTED OPERATING STATEMENT, SPREADER SPECIALISTS
6/1/63 to 12/1/63
Per Exhibit 14
(c35h accounting
nethod)

INCOME
Seles

735996,52

Petal Incone

.:er£ ;in-

expense

^ERATIC'.'S

>~~e-£'.t sxpense
•s» » ^ * •

112017.00

Pro Fprr.a

£5^615.52

735996.52

:?E~ATI':3 EXPENSES
Cr*ice Expese
Advertising
~ersirs
Travel Expense
Licenses, fees £ permits
Lerai Z Accounting
Saia-ies C wages, gross
°ayrcii Taxes
Utah *ees £ taxes
Subcontracts
Ti-es 0 '..neels
"iscellaneous Expense
I-S'-r---:e Expense
F?-T- . .
C.i. 7 jel
lecrec.ation
-".iii-.es 0 telephone
A:%„:r-£nt for c^2^ge to
z-zr^al
rethed
• r :-.

Adjustnents per
Exhibit*
11, 15 0
testinony
of Guy
Wilcken

854515.52

354.90
1D23.B2
52206.00
5921.20
2549.43
2975.50
230161.E7
23587.49

:o.oo

2124.00
1527.17
14458.34
250.74
7529.85
14781.57
1473S3.81
55707.5G
3337.14

r

r^sr*

p.r>

25334.90
1023.82
53205.00
5321.20
2349.43
2973.50
230151.67
22587.49
2124.00
1527.17
14456.24
5250.74
7829.35
14731.57
147253.81
E5707 - 3
0237 14
0

557575.59

525044.59

153421.93

225570.53

19549.04
140772.52

'.00

24049.34
201321.55

EXHIBIT B
RECONSTRUCTED DALAtJCE SHEET
SPREADER SPECIALISTS
1E/31/E3

ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash on Deposit
Accounts Receivable

11D5e.12
13ES34.95

Total Current Assets
FIXED ASSETS
Equipment
Less: Accumulated Depreciation
Total Fixed

147652.07

[

11EC357.7E
E1CEC1.C1)

Assets

3555E5.11

Totcl Assets

5CD24E-.1E

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
C L I E N T LIABILITIES
Notes Payable—Bank Loans
Notes Psy£rle--Dther
Payroll Taxes Deducted
Accounts Payable

E3DDD.0D
1C3DD.DC
CC57.CC
S7cEC.CD

Total Current Liabilities

171E77.5£

•'^ TE-1' LIABILITIES
J^ctes P a y a b l e

1CCSEC.CC

Loans fro- Stockholders

1CCC7E.CC

TotEl Lcnr-terr Liabilities

2C1CSC.CC

Total Liabilities

C331C2.SE

EC: :TY
Cccitel Etock outstanding
^eteiner Earnings (deficit)
TCTAL ECJJTY
Total Liabilities £ Equity

13CCC.DC
ECC^C.EC
7CICC.C:
5D32C9.15

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
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the foregoing
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17 pages numbere:
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REPORT AND ORDER, CASE NO. 84--663-01 , In the Matter of the
Application of SPREADER SPECIALISTS, INC. for Authority to
Operate as a Motor Carrier of Property in Intrastate
Commerce.
in the foregoing
office

entitled

matter or cause, now of record or on file
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Revenue Subject to
Diversion in Order
for Applicant to
Reach 1984 Revenue
Projection (assuming
no market growth)

Percent of
Protestant's
Applicable
Revenue
Diverted

Gross Revenue
Gross Revenue Prom Applicable
Intrastate
Commodities
1983
1983

Projected Intrastate
Revenue for
1984

Clark Tfenk Lines

$

2,738,132

$

2,409,556 (A)

$ 2,409,556 (29.2%)

0%/$0

(29.2%xl46,976)-$42,917

1.78%

Biergy express

$

2,142,614

$

2,142,614 (B)

$ 2,142,614 (26%)

0%/S0

(26%xl46f976)- $38,213

1.78%

>

Natlack

$

2,700,000

$

2,565,000 (C)

$ 2,565,000 (31.1%)

0%/$0

(31.1%xl46,976)-$45,709

1.78%

(0
D
Cb

W.S. Hatch Go,

$

7,488,647

$

1,122,081 (D)

$_ 1,122,081 (13.6%)

0%/$0

(13.6%xl46,976)«S19,989

1.78%

$ 15,069,393

$

8,239,251

$_ 8,239,251 U00%)

$

503,024

$

S 15X572L417

$

Protestant

HX

Subtotal

% Increase/$ Increase
Projected for
1984

$146,828 (G) 1.78%

Applicant
Spreader Specialists
TOTALS

503,024 (E)
8.742.275

$
$

650,000 (P)
8,889,251

29.2%/$146,976
$146.828

A.

Based on Testimony of Craig Maddux; ($2,738,132) x (88% - percentage ot revenue derived from commodities covered in Application)*
$2,409,556.10.

B.

Based on Testimony of Eddie Brinkerhoff that "all of Energy Express' intrastate revenue could be diverted- by Applicant.

C.

Based on Testimony of Prank DeSantis; ($3,000,000 Utah terminal revenue) x (90% intrastate) x (95% petroleum) » $2,565,000

D.

Baaed on Exhibits 58 and 62.

E.

Based on Testimony of Leo Ttiurston and Guy Wilkins and Exhibits 8 and 9; Represents revenue after lease payment to Kitlack
($1,006,048x50%).

P.

Based on "testimony of Guy Wilkins and Exhibit 9; Represents projected revenue assuming Application is granted and lease payments no
longer made.

G.

Based on assumption that all of Spreader Specialists' increased revenue would be diverted from protestants as opposed to contract
carriers, proprietary fleets, contractors, governmental bodies, etc. Revenue diverted from protestants would be less if projected
growth is spread over the entire market fleet.

^v

Revenue Subject to
Diversion in Order
for Applicant to
Reach 1984 Revenue
Projection (assuming
5% market growth)

Percent of
Protestant's
Applicable
Revenue
Diverted

Gross Revenue
Gross Revenue Prom Applicable
Intrastate
commodities
1983
1983

Projected Intrastate
Revenue for 1984
Assuming 5%
Hatket Increase

Clark Tank Lines

S

2,738,132

$ 2,409,556 (A)

$

2,530,034 (29.2%)

5%/$120,477

(29.2%xl21,825)«$35,573

1.4 %

Energy Express

$

2,142,614

$ 2,142,614 (B)

$

2,249,745 (26%)

5%/$107,130

(26%xl21,825)- $31,675

1.4 %

Matlack

$

2,700,000

$ 2,565,000 (C)

$

2,693,250 (31.1%)

5%/$128,250

(31.1%xl21,825)-$37,888

1.4 %

W.S. Hatch Ob.

$

7,488,647

$ 1,122,081 (D)

$

1,178,185 (13.6%)

5%/$ 56,104

(13.6%xl21,825)-$16,568

1.4 %

$ 15,069,393

$

$

8,651,214 (100%)

5%/$411,961

$

$

Protestant

Subtotal

8,239,251

% Increase/S Increase
Projected for 1984
Assuming 5%
Market Increase

$121,704 (G) 1.4 %

Applicant
Spreader Specialists
TOTAIS

503,024

115^,51,2^417

503,024 (E)

i^SjJ42tm27S

$

650,000 (P)

29.2%/$146,976

j 9,301,214

S 25,1S1 (H)

JtUSifitt

A.

Based on Testimony of Craig Maddux; ($2,738,132) x (88% - percentage of revenue derived from commodities covered in Application)*
$2,409,556.10.

B.

Based on Testimony of Eddie Brinkerhoff that "all of Biergy Express' intrastate revenue could be diverted* by Applicant.

C.

Baaed on Testimony of Prank DeSantis; ($3,000,000 Utah terminal revenue) x (90% intrastate) x (95% petroleum) • $2,565,000

D.

Based on Exhibits 58 and 62.

E.

Based on Testimony of Leo Thurston and Guy Wilkins and Exhibits 8 and 9; Represents revenue after lease payment to Natlack ($1,006,048 x
50%).

P.

Based on Testimony of Guy Wilkins and Exhibit 9; Represents projected revenue assuming Application is granted and lease payments no
longer made.

G.

Based on assumption that all of Spreader Specialists' increased revenue would be diverted from protestants as opposed to contract
carriers, proprietary fleets, contractors, governmental bodies, etc. Revenue diverted from protestants would be less if projected
growth is spread over the entire market fleet.

H.

Represents increased revenue to Spreader Specialists based on 5% market growth.

